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CASE NOTES
Consumer Law-Truth in Lending-Each Periodic Statement on Consumer
Credit Account Imposing Finance Charge Constitutes Credit Transaction
in Which Creditor's Disclosure Violation Will Give Rise to Liability for
Damages.-Plaintiff, Fannie Thomas, opened an "open end credit account" 1
with defendant, Myers-Dickson Furniture Company, in October 1968. She made
an initial credit purchase at that time, and three subsequent purchases during the
year 1970. Prior to the effective date of the Truth in Lending Act,2 the de-
fendant sent plaintiff a credit disclosure letter in compliance with section
226.7 (f) of Regulation Z promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board, 8 describing
fully the terms and conditions of the credit agreement and the liabilities in-
curred by plaintiff up to that time. Subsequently, defendant sent plaintiff eleven
monthly billing statements, none of which included the cost of credit life in-
surance in the finance charge.4 The charge for credit life insurance, however, was
stated separately on each of the monthly statements. Plaintiff made one partial
payment each month on the account with the result that each monthly state-
ment imposed escalating finance and credit life insurance charges computed on
the basis of the then outstanding balance.
Plaintiff brought this action alleging that defendant's failures to include the
1. This term, for the purposes of the Truth in Lending Act, is defined in pertinent part
as follows:
"'Open end credit' means consumer credit extended on an account pursuant to a plan
under which (1) the creditor may permit the customer to make purchases or obtain
loans, from time to time, directly from the creditor or indirectly by use of a credit card,
check, or other device, as the plan may provide; (2) the customer has the privilege of paying
the balance in full or in installments; and (3) a finance charge may be computed by the
creditor from time to time on an outstanding unpaid balance." 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(r) (1973).
2. The Truth in Lending Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") is Title I of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act, and includes 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-13, 1631-44, 1661-65
(1970). It became effective July 1, 1969.
3. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-226.1002 (1973), was promulgated by the Federal Re-
serve Board to implement the Truth in Lending Act, under the authority of 15 U.S.C. § 1604
(1970). Section 226.7(f) refers to credit accounts in existence before the Act became effective,
and requires creditors to disclose all the items required to be disclosed for accounts opened
after that date "in a notice mailed or delivered to the customer not later than July 31,
1969." 12 C.F.R. § 226.7(f) (1973).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1970) provides: "[Tihe finance charge shall be determined as
the sum of all charges .. .imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident to
the extension of credit . . . ." The specific charges required to be included in computation
of the finance charge are set out at 15 U.S.C. § 1605 (1970) and at 12 C.F.R. § 226.4
(1973). The Act and Regulation Z require, inter alia, that the cost of credit life insurance be
included in such computation, unless the consumer is aware that the insurance is not
required and has given the creditor a signed writing indicating a desire for such coverage.
15 U.S.C. § 1605(b) (1970); 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a)(5) (1973). Such authorization was not
obtained in the instant case.
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insurance cost in the finance charge violated the Act and Regulation Z. The
federal district court agreed and awarded plaintiff $1,100 in damages and $500
for attorney's fees. Ruling that each periodic statement which imposed a finance
charge and failed to satisfy the Act's disclosure requirements constituted a sep-
arate violation, the court allowed the minimum $100 recovery 5 for each of the
eleven monthly statements which violated the Act.0 On appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and remanded for determination of rea-
sonable attorney's fees for work done on appeal. Thomas v. Myers-Dickson
Furniture Co., 479 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1973).
The stated purpose of the Truth in Lending Act is to "assure a meaningful
disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare ... the
various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of crediLirr
Under the Act, all creditors are required to disclose credit costs in a uniform
manner.8 Assuming that consumers armed with such standardized information
would have more effective buying power,9 Congress mandated that those persons
who extend "consumer credit"' 0 make particularized disclosures about the cost
of that credit.11 Realizing that it would be difficult to encompass in one piece
of legislation all the requirements necessary to provide the consumer with the
assistance intended, Congress delegated to the Federal Reserve Board the au-
thority to prescribe such regulations "as in the judgment of the Board are neces-
sary or proper to effectuate the purposes of . . . [the Act]." ' Under this
authority, the Board promulgated Regulation Z,13 which contains specific dis-
closure rules for the full span of credit relationships covered by the Act.
5. The Act has a minimum award of $100 in damages for violation of its disclosure
requirements. See note 15 infra.
6. Thomas v. Myers-Dickson Furn. Co., [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Consumer
Credit Guide 5 99, 056 (ND. Ga. 1972).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970).
8. The House Committee on Banking and Currency reported on the proposed Act as
follows: "[Bly requiring all creditors to disclose credit information in a uniform manner...
the .American consumer will be given the information he needs to compare the cost of
credit and to make the best informed decision on the use of credit." H.R. Rep. No. 1040,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1967).
9. "The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be enhanced and the compe-
tition among the various financial institutions and other firms engaged in the extension of
consumer credit would be strengthened by the informed use of credit. The informed use of
credit results from an awareness of the cost thereof by consumers. ' 1S U.S.C. § 1601 (1970).
10. "The adjective 'consumer', used with reference to a credit transaction, characterizes
the transaction as one in which the party to whom credit is offered or extended is a natural
person, and the money, property, or services which are the subject of the transaction are
primarily for personal, family, household, or agricultural purposes." 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h)
(1970).
11. General rules for disclosures required to be made are set out at 15 US.C. §§ 1631-39
(1970). More particularized requirements are contained in Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1
-226.13 (1973).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970).
13. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-226.1002 (1973).
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Should any of the disclosures required by the Act or Regulation Z be
omitted,14 section 130 of the Act provides the consumer with a remedy against
the creditor. In the event of a disclosure violation, the creditor shall be liable to
the consumer in an amount equal to twice the amount of the finance charge im-
posed in connection with the transaction, with a minimum recovery of $100 and
a maximum of $1,000.15
It was Congress' belief that "[t]he enforcement of the bill would be accom-
plished largely through the institution of civil actions authorized under... [this
civil liability section] ."16 By providing for a minimum recovery, Congress gave
the consumer a monetary incentive to bring the unheeding creditor into court.
The consumer need not worry about costly attorney's fees or litigation expenses,
provided the action is successful.1 7
Generally speaking, courts have encouraged consumers to sue by construing
the Act broadly in their favor. This tendency is readily discernible in the de-
cisions which have interpreted the civil liability section'S--especially those con-
cerned with the basis for, and the extent of, the creditor's liability under the Act.
From the outset, the judiciary has taken primary jurisdiction over disputes
14. The prevailing view is that omission of disclosures required either by the Act or by
Regulation Z will result in creditor liability. See Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc.,
411 U.S. 356 (1973), discussed at text accompanying notes 59, 76 infra. But see Clontz,
Avoidance of Civil Penalties Imposed by Truth-In-Lending Act, 89 Bank. L.J. 821 (1972)
(taking the position that liability may be imposed only for failure to comply with the
specific disclosure requirements actually contained in the text of the Act).
15. Section 130(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) provides: "Except as otherwise pro-
vided in this section, any creditor who fails in connection with any consumer credit trans-
action to disclose to any person any information required under this part to be disclosed to
that person is liable to that person in an amount equal to the sum of
"(1) twice the amount of the finance charge in connection with the transaction, except
that the liability under this paragraph shall not be less than $100 nor greater than $1,000; and
"(2) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability, the costs of
the action together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court."
16. S. Rep. No. 392, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1967).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2) (1970).
18. See, e.g., Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973) (dis-
cussed at text accompanying notes 59, 76 infra); Palmer v. Wilson, 359 F. Supp. 1099
(N.D. Cal. 1973) (holding that consumer may bring suit under the Act even though he has
rescinded violative transaction); Buford v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Ga.
1971) (holding creditor liable for failure to include $1 notary fee in computation of finance
charge); Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (dis-
cussed at text accompanying notes 37-44 infra). The "unintentional error" defense afforded
to creditors by the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c) (1970), traditionally has been construed
strictly. See, e.g., Douglas v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 334 F. Supp. 1166, 1178 (D. Alas. 1971),
rev'd on other grounds, 469 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding good faith mistake of law no
defense). Contra, Thrift Funds, Inc. v. Jones, 274 So. 2d 150 (La.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
820 (1973) (holding same defense available).
between consumers and creditors arising under the Act. In Ratner v. Chemical
Bank New York Trust Co., l9 the defendant bank contended that under section
108 of the Act the Federal Reserve Board had primary jurisdiction over disputes
between consumers and members of the Federal Reserve System.20 While the
court agreed that section 108 gives the Board the authority to "act as a police-
man over its member banks,"-' it stressed that the provision in question "does
not allow a private party to bring an action before the Board to seek redress...
for any violation of the Act."22 To require the consumer to wait for the Board
to act on a private matter, said the court, would be inconsistent with section
13 0 ,23 which specifically authorizes private damage actions. The court then held
that sections 108 and 130 provide "separate jurisdiction for separate remedies'2-4
-section 108 when the Federal Reserve Board acts on its own initiative, and
section 130 when a private party brings a civil action under the Act.25 Thus, the
Federal Reserve Board is charged with the responsibility of enforcing the Act's
disclosure requirements to protect the "unsophisticated consumer"; 20 the "so-
phisticated consumer" may resort to the courts in the first instance to protect
himself.27
However, in order to bring the creditor into court, the consumer must comply
with the applicable statute of limitations. The Act requires that an action be
brought "within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation."2- In
Wachtel v. West,2 9 a complaint was filed alleging insufficient disclosure on a
second mortgage extended to the plaintiffs approximately eighteen months before
the action was brought. When the defendants moved to dismiss, on the ground
that the statute of limitations had expired, plaintiffs argued that the failure to
19. 309 F. Supp. 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). For the sake of clarity, it should be noted hero
that there are three separate decisions in the Ratner case-one on jurisdiction, (id.,) one on
creditor liability (329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)), and one on class actions under the
Act (54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)). The first two are discussed in the text.
20. 309 F. Supp. at 985. Section 108 of the Act provides that its requirements shall be
enforced by the Federal Reserve Board, in the case of member banks of the Federal Reserve
System. 15 U.S.C. § 1607(a) (1) (B) (1970).
21. 309 F. Supp. at 986.
22. Id.
23. Id. The pertinent subdivisions of section 130 are codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a), (e)
(1970), set out at note 15 supra and note 28 infra.
24. 309 F. Supp. at 986.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 987.
27. This Ratner decision was concerned with subject matter jurisdiction. It does not
authorize the plaintiff to sue in any forum convenient to him, unless proper venue is also
established. See Bernard v. Richter's Jewelry Co., 53 F.R.). 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1970) provides: "Any action under this section may be
brought in any United States district court, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction,
within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation."
29. 344 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. Tenn. 1972), aft'd, 476 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir.), cert denied,
414 U.S. 874 (1973).
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make required disclosures was a continuing violation, and that the one-year
period did not begin to run until the borrowers notified the creditors of their
intention to rescind.30
Finding nothing in the legislative history or in the text of the Act which
specifically defined the point at which a violation occurs, the court concluded
that "the Act itself appears to contemplate that 'a violation' occurs at the mo-
ment a loan transaction is consummated; accordingly, that the limitation ...
commences to run at that moment." 31 The court went on to find that the viola-
tion in this case occurred, at the latest, on the date the creditors actually ex-
tended the loan without making the proper disclosures. Since more than one
year had passed between that date and the date on which the complaint was
filed, the action was held to be barred by the statute of limitations.82
The same rule applies to an open end credit account-the statute expires one
year after the creditor fails to make the disclosures required in connection with
a given transaction. However, the potential for violation is greater in the open
end context, because disclosures are required both before the account is openedu8
and in each periodic billing statement. 34 Applying the Wachtel rule, a failure to
make proper disclosures prior to the opening of an account would constitute a
violation as of the date the account was actually opened. The statute of limita-
tions would run from that time.
As to violations occurring in periodic statements, it was held in White v.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1970) specifies the transactions which the consumer Is allowed
to rescind. Generally, any transaction by which the creditor acquires or retains a security
interest in the consumer's residence may be rescinded within the specified time, except for a
first mortgage on that residence.
31. 344 F. Supp. at 681. Regulation Z provides that a transaction is "consummated"
when a contractual relationship is created, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(cc) (1973); thus under the
Wachtel rule, the statute would begin to run even before the credit is actually extended. On
the other hand, the Act provides that in the case of a loan, the creditor is required to make
the disclosures before credit is extended. The disclosures may be made in the contract for
loan. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(b) (1970). But if the creditor receives an unsolicited purchase order
by mail or telephone and the required disclosures were contained in printed material dis-
tributed to the public by the creditor, "then the disclosures required . . . may be made at
any time not later than the date the first payment is due." Id. § 1639(c). The rule for closed
end sales transactions is similar. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(b), (c) (1970). In point of fact, dis-
closures are not ordinarily made until the consumer is ready to sign the promissory note or
installment contract. Although this practice is fully consistent with the provisions cited, It
hardly advances the purposes of the Act, for under these circumstances, the consumer is
unable to "compare ... the various credit terms available to him." 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970).
It is submitted that in order to implement fully the purposes of Truth in Lending, the
statute should be amended to require that disclosures be made at least three days before
credit is extended. For an excellent discussion of the policy considerations see Bissette v.
Colonial Mortgage Corp., 340 F. Supp. 1191 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd, 477 F.2d 1245 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
32. 344 F. Supp. at 681.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1637(a) (1970).
34. Id. § 1637(b).
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Central Charge Service, Inc.,35 that the statute begins to run when the consumer
receives a billing statement which fails to meet the Act's disclosure requirements.
Under this approach, the consumer has a timely cause of action if he has re-
ceived an incomplete billing statement within the past year, regardless of when
the account was opened or credit actually extended. 30
Nor is it necessary that the consumer suffer any actual damage in order to
hold the creditor liable for failure to make complete and accurate disclosures.
The consumer need only prove that a disclosure violation has occurred. In the
decision on the merits in the Ratner case,37 the court held that "the basis for the
liability is the creditor's failure 'to disclose to any person any information re-
quired... to be disclosed. . .. , "38 The essential thrust of defendant's argument
was that the plaintiff had suffered no injury as a result of the failure to disclose
the required information. To this the court replied:
There is no requirement that the plaintiff prove he himself was deceived. There is no
requirement that he should have been led by the deception to pay the "finance charge
in connection with the transaction .... 39
Thus, the civil liability provisions apply whenever a disclosure violation is found
to exist, unless the creditor can avail himself of one of the defenses provided by
the Act.40 Injury to the consumer is not a necessary ingredient of the cause of
action. In the court's view, Congress had made clear its scheme for private en-
forcement when "[i] t invited people like the present plaintiff... to sue in the
public interest."41 In so doing, the aim was "to create a species of 'private at-
torney general' to participate prominently in enforcement." '4
Because the Act requires disclosure of credit costs to consumers "upon whom
a finance charge is or may be imposed,"43 the fact that no finance charge is ac-
35. [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Consumer Credit Guide 11 99,170 (Super. CL D.C.
1972).
36. While this approach is of some benefit to the consumer, it cannot cure the defect
inherent in the statute. As currently written, the statute of limitations bars actions one year
after "the occurrence of the violation," 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1970), whether or not the con-
sumer is aware that a violation has occurred. It is submitted that the private consumer
could be more effective in enforcing the Act were the provision to read "within one year
from the date the consumer knows or has reason to know that a violation has occurred." For
an opinion in support of this view see Wachtel v. West, 476 F.Zd 1062, 1066-67 (6th Cir.)
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973) (Young, J., dissenting). If such a provision would place
too great a burden of uncertainty upon the creditor, then a more reasonable maximum time
limit, perhaps three years from the occurrence of a violation, could be imposed.
37. Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
38. Id. at 280.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 281-82; 15 US.C. § 1640(b), (d) (1970).
41. 329 F. Supp. at 280.
42. Id. (emphasis added). The phrase "private attorney general" is used in many of the
decisions which came after Ratner, including the Thomas case, 479 F.2d at 748. This
method of private enforcement was basically the Senate's idea. See text accompanying note 16
supra.
43. 15 US.C. § 1631(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
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tually imposed by the billing statement in which the violation occurs is im-
material to the determination of liability. Further, as the Ratner court correctly
concluded, damages may still be awarded for the violation, even in the absence
of a finance charge on which to base the calculation of the award.44 Under such
circumstances, the consumer is entitled to the $100 minimum statutory recovery.
When a finance charge is imposed, however, it may become the basis for the
calculation of the damages to be awarded for a violation, for the Act has set the
damages recoverable at "twice the amount of the finance charge in connection
with the transaction .... ," The question then arises--what constitutes a "trans-
action" in the open end context?
Open end credit accounts are commonly used for multiple purchases which
result in constantly changing credit balances. New and different finance charges
usually are imposed by each monthly billing statement. Disclosure violations
may occur at the opening of the account, or in any of the periodic statements
which follow. Any of these events could be considered a "transaction." As the
amount of damages to be awarded in connection with a failure to disclose will
necessarily be controlled by the number of transactions involved in the con-
troversy, it is necessary to define "transaction" in order to select the finance
charge which may serve as a basis for computation of damages under the Act.
Ordinarily, such a question could be resolved by consulting the legislative
history of the statute. However, the record is nearly devoid of reference to, or
explanation of, the civil liability section. Congress seems to have assumed that
the provision was self-explanatory, and that with it, the Act would be "self
enforcing." 4 Even the Federal Reserve Board has indicated some uncertainty
in this area. In a report to Congress, the Board noted that "[il t might be con-
tended that each separate purchase... constitutes a 'transaction' for purposes
of Section 130, or that each periodic statement is a transaction. '47 However, the
Board's opinion was that "[m] ore likely the opening and use of the account is
a single transaction. '48
In Willis v. American National Stores,49 it would seem that the court adopted
this latter interpretation. In a dispute involving insufficient disclosures prior to
the opening of a consumer credit account, the court interpreted the liability
provision to mean that "the damages recoverable shall be twice the amount of
the finance charge which would have been collected in connection with the trans-
action [a credit purchase made after the account was opened] had the consumer
paid off his account in regular monthly installments."G0
It is submitted that the Willis court erred in applying this measure of damages
44. 329 F. Supp. at 280.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1) (1970).
46. 113 Cong. Rec. 2050 (1967) (commentary on S. 5, the proposed Truth in Lending
bill).
47. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Annual Report to Congress on
Truth In Lending for the Year 1971 at 18 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Annual Report].
48. Id. at 18-19.
49. 350 F. Supp. 173 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
50. Id. at 177 (emphasis added).
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in an open end situation. The specific finding of the court was that the creditor
failed to make the proper disclosures before opening the consumer's account, a
defect which could not be cured by the making of complete and accurate dis-
closures at the time of the purchase in question.51 Ostensibly, this would imply
a recognition that the two events constituted completely separate occurrences
in the development of the account. However, the court based its damage award
on the finance charge which could have been collected in connection with the
purchase.52 It would seem preferable to have looked to the opening of the ac-
count wherein the violation occurred, and to have allowed only the minimum
recovery because no finance charge had been imposed at that stage. The failure
to do so indicates that the court was proceeding on one of two theories--ether
the opening and use of the account were viewed as a single transaction, or the
purchase was considered to be the only transaction involved.
A credit purchase may be considered a transaction in some contexts,53 but not
within the meaning of the civil liability provisions of the Act in the open end situ-
ation. The Act provides for liability on the part of "any creditor who fails in con-
nection with any consumer credit transaction to disclose .... 5.4 As noted above,
the Act requires disclosures to be made before initiating an open end account
and in each periodic statement; no disclosures are required to be made at the
time of any particular purchase on such an account. It is submitted that the
Act must be read to define "transaction," as used in the civil liability section, to
mean any event in a consumer credit relationship for which disclosures are re-
quired to be made.55 The open end credit account may then be seen as a series
of "transactions"--first the establishment of the account, then its development
and use as represented by periodic statements.
The court in Thovas v. Myers-Dickson Furniture Co.50 had a better appre-
ciation of the true nature of open end credit accounts under the Act. As men-
tioned previously,57 the district court had concluded that the minimum recovery
could be allowed for each periodic statement providing less than full disclosure.
On appeal, defendant contended that "transaction," in the open end context,
refers to the establishment and use of an account as a single event; that the Act,
51. Id. at 176-77.
52. Id. at 177.
53. The Uniform Commercial Code defines "purchase" as "taking by sale ...or any
other voluntary transaction ...." U.C.C. § 1-201(32).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970) (emphasis added); see note 15 supra.
55. At first glancej this may appear circular in light of 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (text accom-
panying note 54 supra). However, nowhere does the Act define "transaction." By defining
transaction to mean any consumer credit relationship for which disclosures are required to
be made, transaction becomes defined by those provisions of the Act and Regulation Z
which prescribe when disclosures must be made-at the opening of the account and in each
periodic billing statement. In accordance with the holding in Thomas, only those periodic
statements imposing a new finance charge will provide a basis for liability for a disclosure
violation.
56. 479 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1973).
57. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
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therefore, contemplates only one award of damages within the specified range
per consumer credit account.58 This position is arguable on the theory that the
only extension of credit involved was the permission given the consumer to make
purchases to the extent of his credit limit, and that subsequent use of the account
was merely the natural outgrowth of that "transaction". Such an interpretation
would necessarily limit the consumer's recovery as defendant suggested, whether
there were one or one hundred purchases on the account, and regardless of the
number of incomplete billing statements issued in connection therewith.
The court of appeals did not agree.59 It placed heavy reliance on Mourning v.
Family Publications Service, Inc.,60 the only Truth in Lending case yet to be
argued before the Supreme Court. Drawing from that decision a policy mandate
that the Act be broadly construed,6 ' the Fifth Circuit dismissed the defendant's
interpretation as "both illogical and inconsistent with the purposes of the Act."10 2
Instead, the court found that "[w]ithin the 'open end credit account' context,
'transaction' more logically refers to each 'periodic statement.' ,,on The rationale
given for this conclusion was that "each month's billing statement may ... be
viewed as an invitation to the customer to decline to pay off the balance and
instead to 'carry his account on credit' with a new and different 'finance charge'
being imposed." 64 Observing that plaintiff had made four separate purchases
from defendant, and had received eleven monthly statements, each imposing a
new finance charge, the court found that "[e]ach statement solicited, albeit sub
silentio, a new credit obligation ... ."05 Noting further that the disclosure pro-
58. 479 F.2d at 746-47. Defendant relied principally on the Annual Report, supra note
47, which states: "There is some uncertainty as to the meaning of 'transaction' when applying
Section 130 to a possible error on a periodic statement used in connection with an open end
account. It might be contended that each separate purchase for which a credit card is used
constitutes a 'transaction' for purposes of Section 130, or that each periodic statement is a
transaction. More likely the opening and use of the account is a single transaction." Id. at
18-19.
59. "We hold that damages are not so limited." 479 F.2d at 746. The court noted that
the authority cited by defendants was not an official Board interpretation, but merely a
suggestion as to the "more likely" meaning of the statute. Id. at 747. But see FRB-Sug-
gested Amendments to Truth in Lending Act, 4 CCH Consumer Credit Guide II 30,811,
where among the amendments suggested by the Board is one which would define the term
"transaction" in essentially the same way as did the Annual Report, and limit the damages
for multiple violations in connection with a single purchase on the account to a single re-
covery within the specified range. This would indicate that the meaning suggested in the
Annual Report was an excellent barometer of what the Board would consider to be the
proper meaning, should the matter come up for official interpretation. However, congres-
sional rejection may be inferred from its failure to act upon the proposal, and even the
Annual Report recognizes that other interpretations may be attached to the language of tho
Act as it now stands.
60. 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
61. See 479 F.2d at 740-42.
62. Id. at 747.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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visions of the Act and Regulation Z apply with equal effect to each periodic
statement on a credit account, the court held that
as to "open end credit accounts," each "periodic statenent" that imposes a new "finance
charge" constitutes a separate transaction within the meaning of 15 U.S.C.
§ 1640(a). 66
On this basis, the court affirmed the district court's allowance of the minimum
$100 recovery for each periodic statement that failed to make complete and
accurate disclosure.67
With regard to other issues presented, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding that credit accounts open prior to the Act's effective date are
subject to its disclosure requirements; 68 held the amount of attorney's fees
awarded below to be within the range of judicial discretion,60 and authorized an
award of attorney's fees for work done on appeal.70 Although appellate fees are
not authorized specifically in the Act, the court agreed with the plaintiff that
such an award is mandated by its terms. Noting that "the Act allows fees in 'any
successful action,' ,,71 the court declared that "an action cannot be said to be
'successful' when an appeal is taken unless the victory below is defended on
appeal."72 Consequently, the court remanded the case to the district court for
determination of a reasonable award for appellate fees.73
In its conclusion, the court of appeals cited the Ratner decision on creditor
liability in support of the premise that the language of the Act "should be con-
strued liberally in light of its broadly remedial purpose."74 Finding that "[t]he
regulatory scheme forcefully expounds an emerging ethic of 'caveat vendor,"
the court announced that "we will not strain to avoid giving effect to the Federal
Consumer Credit Protection Act."75
As a result of the Thomas decision, the Ratner holding should be restricted
to its facts. The principle remains undisturbed in the situation where no finance
charge is actually imposed in connection with the transaction in which the viola-
tion occurred. It is necessary to grant the litigant some reward in order to en-
courage private enforcement of the Act by consumers. In the case where there
is no finance charge to use as a basis for computation of damages, the only solu-
tion is to allow the minimum recovery, as was done by the Ratner court. 7 This
result would appear to be in harmony with the Supreme Court's construction of
the statute. In the Mourning case, where no finance charge was established, the
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 742.
68. Id.; see the court's discussion at 744-46.
69. Id. at 748.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. (emphasis by the court).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. (emphasis by the court).
76. Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (hold-
ig plaintiff entitled to $100 in damages, plus $20,000 in attorney's fees).
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Court concluded that "imposition of the minimum sanction is proper in cases
such as this, where the finance charge is nonexistent or undetermined1 77 The
same principle presumably would operate if a consumer were to pay off his ac-
count before a finance charge could be imposed, and then bring suit for a dis-
closure violation. Liability thus can exist in the absence of a finance charge, at
least where a "new" violation appears on a given billing statement. The Thomas
definition of "transaction,"78 however, would suggest that no liability would arise
for repetition of the same violation in successive billing statements unless such
statements imposed a new finance charge. The implication is that the consumer
will not be allowed to increase his initial recovery unless he has suffered injury
in some way. It is in this sense that Ratner has been restricted.
On the other hand, it would seem that under the Thomas reasoning, the Willis
interpretation of the Act's damage provision is inapplicable in the open end
context. It is arguable that in a closed end transaction, where the amount of
credit extended and the finance charge imposed thereon are fixed, the damage
award properly could be based on the total amount of finance charges which
might be incurred in connection with the transaction. But in applying this meas-
ure of damages to a disclosure violation on an open end account, the Willis
court erred in two ways.
First, the disclosure violation occurred prior to the opening of the consumer's
account, a point at which no finance charge had been imposed. In view of the
conclusions in Mourning and Ratner, the plaintiff in Willis should have been
allowed only the minimum recovery.
The second and more important error in the Willis decision is its failure to
recognize the basic characteristic of an open end credit account-that it consists
of a series of "transactions," even though there is only one purchase made on
the account. To predicate the damage award on the finance charges which could
be imposed in connection with a single purchase is to assume either that all ac-
tivity in a credit account constitutes a single transaction, or that the only trans-
action possible in a credit account is a credit purchase.79 Neither theory is cor-
rect. The former interpretation was advanced by the defendant in the Thomas
case and was explicitly rejected by that court.80 It runs directly contrary to the
holding that each periodic statement imposing a new finance charge constitutes
a separate transaction. The latter premise was implicitly dismissed by the court's
omission of any reference to a credit purchase in its discussion of the meaning
of "transaction."
Hence, even if it were proper in the Willis case to base the damage award on
the finance charges incurred after the account had been opened, as would be the
case if the violations had occurred in the billing statements, the method used to
calculate the damages and the rationale expressed would still be inapplicable.
The result would be to limit the consumer to a recovery based on a single trans-
77. 411 U.S. at 376.
78. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
79. See text accompanying notes 49-52 supra.
80. 479 F.2d at 747.
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action, when in fact several transactions existed. Rather, damages in that situa-
tion should be awarded, as in Thonwrs, on the basis of the finance charges im-
posed in each periodic statement in which a disclosure violation occurred.
With respect to private enforcement of the Act, therefore, the Thomas decision
emerges as the most logical and effective interpretation of the Act's damage
provisions as applied to an open end credit account. Although the decision should
serve to eliminate much of the controversy surrounding the term "transaction"
as used in the open end context, it remains for Congress to define specifically
each of the terms used in the civil liability section. A clear expression of the
legislature's intent would be beneficial to the consumer and creditor alike.
Christopher S. Rooney
Federal Procedure---"Executive" Privilege-Certain Police Reports Held
Privileged in Civil Rights Action.-In a civil rights action brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 plaintiffs sued to recover damages for the death of their
husband and father, who was shot, allegedly without cause, by policemen who
were pursuing decedent and his brother, apparently for traffic infractions. De-
fendants were several police officers and their superiors, including the police
commissioner. Plaintiffs sought discovery of police records of the investigation
of the incident, analyses of the physical evidence, statements from police and
other witnesses following the incident, and all written police communications
and reports concerning decedent and his brother.2 The police resisted discovery,
invoking executive privilege, on the ground that the investigations were made
"under a veil of confidentiality" and their disclosure would "contravene the
public interest" and "impair the functioning" of the police department.3 After
balancing "the public interest in the confidentiality of governmental information
against the needs of a litigant to obtain data, not otherwise available, ' 4 the court
ordered production of the requested documents, with two exceptions. First,
"evaluative summary" portions of the investigative reports were to be excised
1. "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured In an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
2. Defendants had previously agreed to make available radio tapes of the incident, physical
evidence, photographs of the scene, the autopsy report, lists of known witnesses, and a list
of any prior or subsequent incidents involving the decedent, his brother, and plaintilf-wife.
Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339, 340 (E.M. Pa. 1973).
3. Id. at 342. The court summarily rejected claims of attorney-client privilege, and the
"work-product" exemption. Id. at 341-42 & nn,4-S. Polygraph results, which were neither
relevant or admissible, nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence, were without the proper scope of discovery, and discovery was accordingly denied.
Id. at 341 n-3. The relevance of the other documents was not questioned.
4. Id. at 344.
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before production; , second, the reports of other incidents involving decedent
and his brother were to be inspected in camera to determine whether disclosure
would be warranted according to the balancing test devised by the court.0
Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
Built into this balancing test were ten basic considerations deemed by the
court to be appropriate in deciding a discovery motion against a police depart-
ment in a civil rights action.7 An assessment of these considerations is the aim
of this Case Note.
Under Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "[p]arties
may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to
the subject matter involved in the pending action .... ,,8 "Privilege" as used in
Rule 26 should be interpreted as it is in the law of evidence applicable at trial,0
which is currently governed by Rule 43.10
5. Id. at 345.
6. Id. at 346. The court apparently also wished to determine the relevance of these other
incidents to the incident at bar, and whether the data was factual or evaluative.
7. These are set out in text accompanying note 64 infra.
8. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1). Materials prepared in anticipation of litigation, even If
relevant and unprivileged, are discoverable "only upon a showing that the party seeking
discovery has substantial need ... and ... is unable without undue hardship to obtain the
substantial equivalent of the materials by other means." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (3). Protective
orders may be granted by the court to protect a party "from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
9. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl
Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 323 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Carl Zeiss, Jena v.
Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967) [hereinafter referred to
as Carl Zeiss].
10. Rule 43(a) provides that evidence is admissible if it is admissible under (1) a federal
statute, (2) the rules of evidence applied in federal courts in suits of equity before the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective, or (3) the rules of evidence applied in the
forum state. Fed. R. Civ. P. 43 (a). One of the important questions raised by this rule Is to
what extent state-created privileges must be recognized in federal courts. See 9 C. Wright &
A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil § 2408 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Wright &
Miller]. Commentators have variously described the state of the law with respect to recogni-
tion of state-created privileges in diversity versus federal question litigation. See, e.g., 4 J.
Moore, Federal Practice ff 26.60[7] (2d ed. 1974) ; 9 Wright & Miller § 2408; Krattenmaker,
Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, 62 Geo. L.J. 61, 108-15 (1973). Nevertheless, in civil rights actions where a state-
created privilege has been claimed, it has been held that the court need not recognize it, but
instead must independently weigh the policies underlying the privilege. Carr v. Monroe Mfg.
Co., 431 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1000 (1971); see Gaison v. Scott,
59 F.R.D. 347, 351 (D. Hawaii 1973).
Had the proposed Rules of Evidence, as approved by the Supreme Court, been enacted
in 1973, the law of privileges that had evolved under Rule 43(a) would have been changed.
The Court-approved draft recognized only those privileges required by the Constitution, by
an act of Congress, by rules adopted by the Supreme Court, or by the Rules of Evidence
themselves. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, Rule 501, 56 F.R.D.
183 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Court-Approved Draft of Fed. R. Evid.]. Thus, no state-
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Governmental privileges have been recognized in the federal courts for "secrets
of state" (comprising military and diplomatic secrets), 1' and for "official in-
formation" (comprising governmental data less sensitive than secrets of state) ,12
on grounds of public policy, namely, that disclosure would be harmful to the
public interest.13 As the Supreme Court recognized in United States v. Reynolds,14
created privileges would have been recognized, even in diversity cases. Court-Approved
Draft of Fed. R. Evid., Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 501. Nor did the proposed
Rules provide an "official information" privilege for state governmental units. It was partly
due to these results that Congress declared that the Rules were to have "no force or effect
except to the extent, and with such amendments, as they may be expressly approved by Act
of Congress." Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (1973). Had Congress not acted, the Rules
would have become effective on July 1, 1973. See 119 Cong. Rec. H 1725 (daily ed. Mar.
14, 1973); Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Special Subcomm. on Re-
form of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess,
ser. 2 (1973).
In February, 1974, the House of Representatives passed an amended version of the Court-
approved Rules, which, in place of the enumerated privileges of the Court's draft, would
provide in Rule 501 that privilege questions "shall be governed by the principles of the coin-
mon law as ... interpreted ... in the light of reason and experience," and that state privilege
law be recognized in instances wherein state law "supplies the rule of decision." See H.R. 5463,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The House's intention was to leave the law of privileges in
its present state. 120 Cong. Rec. H 307 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Hungate) ;
id. at H 315 (remarks of Rep. Dennis). But it is not dear that the courts are currently
recognizing state privileges only in diversity cases, as this rule would provide. See, eg., 4
J. Moore, Federal Practice ff 26.60[7] (2d ed. 1974); 9 Wright & Miller § 2403; Kratten-
maker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to the Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence, 62 Geo. L.J. 61, 108-15 (1973).
The House also passed an amendment to Title 28 of the United States Code, adding §
2076, which would permit Supreme Court amendments to the Rules of Evidence. Such
amendments must be reported to Congress and go into effect within 180 days unless expressly
disapproved by either house of Congress, with one exception: "Any such amendment cre-
ating, abolishing, or modifying a privilege shall have no force or effect unless it shall be
approved by act of Congress ... 2'120 Cong. Rec. H 567 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974). This pro-
vision is an assertion of congressional prerogative in an area involving "extraordinarily
important social objectives" which are "truly legislative in nature." Id. (remarks of Rep.
Holtzman). The House bill awaits Senate action at this writing.
11. "Secrets of state" are similarly defined in: Court-Approved Draft of Fed. R. Evid.,
Rule 509(a) (1); Model Code of Evidence rule 227(1) (1942); C. McCormick, Evidence §
107 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCormick].
12. See 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2378 (3. McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
Wigmore]. Categorization of governmental information as either secrets of state or official
information has been used in attempts to codify the law of privileges. See Court-Approved
Draft of Fed. R. Evid., Rule 509; Model Code of Evidence rules 227 & 228 (1942).
These privileges are "topical," and apply irrespective of the person in possession. 8 Wigmore
§ 2367. Thus, the narrower terms of "secrets of state" and "official information" privileges,
which imply this topical nature, are preferable to the use of "executive" privilege, which
suggests the party or governmental branch in possession of the data. Furthermore, the term
"executive privilege" has broader implications which are not relevant. See note 20 infra.
13. See, e.g., Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875); Wood v. Breier, 54 F.R.D.
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the state secrets privilege is well established at common law, and is absolute, since
it applies whenever such secrets are present, so that not even "the most com-
pelling necessity" of a litigant can overcome it.1r On the other hand, the official
information privilege is qualified, since it applies only when disclosure of the
documents in question would be harmful to the public interest, and then, only
after a balancing test reveals that the litigant's need does not outweigh the
harmfulness of disclosure.' 6
Before balancing the interests in each case of official information privilege,
however, the courts normally dispose of any question of relevance, and make
certain that the privilege was properly raised in accordance with the require-
ments set forth in Reynolds:17 the privilege belongs to, and therefore must be
claimed or waived by, the government; it is not to be lightly invoked; it must
7, 11 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Carl Zeiss, 40 F.R.D. at 324; Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States, 38 F.R.D. 57, 64-65 (NJ). Ohio 1964) ; United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15
F.R.D. 224, 230 (S.D. Cal. 1953); Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F.
Supp. 939, 946 (Ct. CI. 1958); Hardin, Executive Privilege in the Federal Courts, 71 Yale
L.J. 879, 880-81 (1962).
Protection of the public interest is also the basis of the informer's privilege which protects
the identity of informers who provide the government with information on criminal law
violations, in order to foster the flow of such information to the government. Roviaro v.
United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957). Informers' statements are protected only If disclosure
would in effect reveal the identities of the informers. Id. at 60; United States v. Real Estate
Bd., 59 F.R.D. 637 (ED. Mo. 1973). The privilege has been extended to noncriminal law
enforcement situations. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Charles Martin Insp'rs of Petrol., Inc., 459 F.2d
303 (5th Cir. 1972) (suit for violation of minimum wage, overtime and record keeping laws) ;
Court-Approved Draft of Fed. R. Evid., Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 510. Contra,
Brennan v. Automatic Toll Sys., Inc., 60 F.R.D. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (suit for violation of
overtime laws).
14. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
15. Id. at 11; see Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875); McCormick § 107; 8
Wigmore § 2378; Morgan, Foreword to Model Code of Evidence at 23 (1942).
16. See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 716-17 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Carr v. Monroe Mfg. Co.,
431 F.2d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1000 (1971); Kahn v. Secretary
of HEW, 53 F.R.D. 241, 244 (D. Mass. 1971); O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 38 F.R.D. 329, 335
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 57, 63 (N.D. Ohio
1964); Evans v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 255, 257-58 (W.D. La. 1950); United States v.
Cotton Valley Opr's Comm., 9 F.R.D. 719, 721 (W.D. La. 1949), aff'd by an equally divided
Court, 339 U.S. 940 (1950). Thus, although there is a presupposed public injury In the dis-
closure of state secrets, in the case of official information, the court determines from the
facts whether disclosure would be more harmful than nondisclosure. See Morgan, Foreword
to Model Code of Evidence at 23 (1942).
17. 345 U.S. at 7-8. Although Reynolds concerned a claim of military secrets, the formal
requirements it set forth have been applied to official information cases. Carl Zeiss, 40 F.R.D.
at 326-27 n.33; see, e.g., Committee for Nuclear Respons., Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788,
791 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Carr. v. Monroe Mfg. Co., 431 F.2d 386, 389-90 (5th Cir. 1970, cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1000 (1971); Philadelphia Resistance v. Mitchell, 58 F.R.D. 139, 142 (ED.
Pa. 1972); Carter v. Carlson, 56 F.R.D. 9, 10-11 (D.D.C. 1972); United States v. Certain
Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224, 229-33 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
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be claimed formally by the head of the governmental department involved and
only after personal consideration of the matter.'8 Moreover, a bare assertion of
privilege is insufficient; there must be specific support for the claim.' 0 Then, as
Reynolds also confirmed, the court, and not an executive official, decides the
question of privilege.20
The specific elements of each balancing test will vary from case to case, but
the first question the court faces is whether the documents requested contain
facts or evaluations. As a general rule, purely factual material (not including
secrets of state) is not privileged.2 ' But evaluative materials-intra-govern-
18. 345 U.S. at 7-8. However, some decisions suggest that it may not be necessary for a
department head to lodge a formal claim. See McFadden v. Avco Corp., 278 F. Supp. 57,
59 (M.D. Ala. 1967); Merchants Nat'l Bank v. United States, 41 F.R.D. 266, 268 (D.ND.
1966) ; Rosee v. Board of Trade, 35 F.R.D. 512, 514 (N.D. IIl. 1964).
19. See, e.g., Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Carter v. Carlson, 56
F.R.D. 9, 11 (D.D.C. 1972); United States v. 30 Individually Cartoned Jars, 43 F.R.D. 181,
190 (D. Del 1967); Park & Tilford Distillers Corp. v. United States, 20 F.R.D. 404, 406-07
(S.D.N.Y. 1957).
20. "Judicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of
executive officers." 345 US. at 9-10. The government had claimed that it was within the
power of federal executive department heads to withhold documents from judicial review if
they deemed it to be in the public interest to do so. Although this claim suggested an in-
herent executive power "protected in the constitutional system of separation of power," the
Court found it unnecessary to pass on the constitutional overtones, dealing instead with the
narrower issue of common law privilege for military secrets. Id. at 6-7 & n.9.
The constitutional question has not yet been resolved by the Supreme Court, although
two recent lower court decisions in point rejected the notion that separation of powers man-
dates absolute executive discretion, even at the Presidential level, with respect to disclosure
of government information. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Committee for
Nuclear Respons., Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See generally Berger &
Krash, Government Immunity from Discovery, 59 Yale L.J. 1451 (1950); Bishop, The
Executive's Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional Question, 66 Yale L.J. 477
(1957); Hardin, Executive Privilege in the Federal Courts, 71 Yale LJ. 879 (1962). How-
ever, those who would recognize broad, constitutionally-based executive discretion at the
highest levels of government distinguish that privilege from the "common sense-common
law privilege of confidentiality necessary in government administration," which is the sub-
ject of this Case Note. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 763-66, 773-74, 798-99 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (Wilkey, J., dissenting); see id. at 745-46 (MacKinnon, J., concurring & dissenting).
In 1968, overruling a long line of English cases, the House of Lords held that: the court
was to make the final decision on whether documents should be disclosed over an executive's
claim of privilege; that the appropriate method of deciding was by balancing the competing
interests; and that private inspection by the judge should be made in any case wherein the
court was inclined to order production. Conway v. Rimmer, [1968] A.C. 910. For a discus-
sion of the significance of this holding see Cappelletti & Golden, Crown Privilege and Execu-
tive Privilege: A British Response to an American Controversy, 25 Stan. L. Rev. 836 (1973).
21. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86-88 (1973); Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336,
340-41 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963); Brown v. United States, 58 F.R.D.
599, 605-06 (D.S.C. 1973); Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 57 F.R.D. 133, 137
(E.D. Wis. 1972); Simons-Eastern Co. v. United States, 55 F.R.D. 88, 89 (ND. Ga. 1972);
O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 38 F.R.D. 329, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
1974]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42
mental advice, opinions, and recommendations on which policies and decisions
are based-are frequently held to require protection from disclosure; 2 2 justifica-
tion is found in the public policy of fostering free and frank discussion among
executive officials in the conduct of their duties, by protecting their mental pro-
cesses from exposure.2 3 However, in each case "[i] t is necessary ... to consider
the circumstances around the [discovery request] in order to determine whether
or not ... production is injurious to the consultative functions of government
that the privilege of non-disclosure protects.124 Thus, evaluative materials have
been held discoverable when disclosure would not compromise the consultation
process.25 Furthermore, although the mental processes leading to the proper
exercise of power are usually not discoverable, nor even relevant in judicial
22. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86-88 (1973); Freeman v. Seligson, 405 F.2d 1326,
1339 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
896 (1963); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 280 F.2d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Zacher
v. United States, 227 F.2d 219, 226 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 993 (1956) (letter
from United States Attorney to Attorney General, suggesting a case be dropped, held priv-
ileged); Carl Zeiss, 40 F.R.D. at 324; SEC v. Shasta Minerals & Chem. Co., 36 F.R.D. 23
(D. Utah 1964); E.W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 203 F. Supp. 175 (NJ). Ohio 1961).
23. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86-87 (1973); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 713 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Union Oil Co. v. Morton, 56 F.R.D. 643, 644 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Carl Zeiss, 40
F.R.D. at 324-26; Rosee v. Board of Trade, 36 F.R.D. 684, 689 (N.D. II. 1965); Kaiser
Alum. & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 946 (Ct. Cl. 1958). At present,
The Freedom of Information Act, S U.S.C. § 552 (1970), assures wide public access
to federal governmental information. However, the Act's exemptions include "inter-agency or
intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other
than an agency in litigation with the agency." Id. § 552(b)(5) (1970). Thus, public
requests for such "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters" are governed by
the same principles employed under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when a
private party seeks discovery in litigation with the agency. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 85-91
(1973); Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 582 (D.C. Cir.
1970); GSA v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 1969); see Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d
1336, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1969). However, disclosure under the Act will be more limited than
under discovery procedures, because only the latter involve weighing the requesting party's
need. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86 (1973); Sterling Drug Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698,
704-05 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See generally Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis,
34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 761 (1967); Note, The Freedom of Information Act-The Parameters
of the Exemptions, 62 Geo. L.J. 177 (1973); Note, Freedom of Information: The Statute
and the Regulations, 56 Geo. L.J. 18 (1967); Note, The Freedom of Information Act and
the Exemption for Intra-Agency Memoranda, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1047 (1973); 47 Ind. L.J.
530 (1972) ; 50 Texas L. Rev. 1006 (1972).
24. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 946 (Ct. Cl. 1958);
see EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87 (1973).
25. Abel Invest. Co. v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 485, 490 (D. Neb. 1971) (routine tax
report containing mental impressions, conclusions, and legal theories held discoverable);
Peterson v. United States, 52 F.R.D. 317, 321 (S.D. Ill. 1971) (possibility of disclosure In
litigation thought unlikely to deter full and candid evaluations by officials in the future);
Stolberg v. Buley, 50 F.R.D. 281 (D. Conn. 1970) (disclosure of communications between
college officials and state attorney general, concerning an administrative proceeding involving
proceedings, 26 production of relevant documents has been ordered when a case
stemmed from alleged misuse of power3 7 It has also been held that documents
otherwise privileged were discoverable when the privilege claim was not raised
by the department head.3 In addition, an occasion may arise when the policy
favoring nondisclosure will be outweighed by the litigant's need.2 Obviously,
governmental records and memoranda frequently will contain both facts and
evaluations. When these are inextricably intertwined, discovery of both may be
precluded.30 However, when facts and evaluations are separable, the courts have
required production of the factual portions.81
Without inspecting the documents, it may be impossible for a court to decide
the privilege issue.3 Some courts have suggested, however, that even the limited
exposure of the material to the judge during in camera inspection should not be
automatic. 33 Heeding the Reynolds warning that the court should not force the
disclosure of that which the privilege is designed to protect,34 one court de-
manded "reasonable clarity" that the requesting party is entitled to at least
some of the materials before in camera inspection is ordered.m5 In situations not
involving secrets of state, however, exposure in camera seems at worst a minor
invasion when compared to the possibilities of ordering unwarranted disclosure
or of denying discovery of highly relevant materials. Therefore, many courts
denial of tenure, would not inhibit the communication process); see United States v. 30
Individually Cartoned Jars, 43 F.R.D. 181, 190 (D. Del. 1967).
26. See Rosee v. Board of Trade, 36 F.R.D. 684, 689 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
27. Olsen v. Camp, 328 F. Supp. 728, 731 (E.D. Mich. 1970); Bank of Dearborn v.
Saxon, 244 F. Supp. 394, 401-03 (E.D. Mich. 1965), aff'd, 377 F.2d 496 (6th Cir. 1967);
Rosee v. Board of Trade, 36 F.R.D. 684, 689-90 (NJ). Ill. 1965); United States v. Procter
& Gamble Co., 25 F.R.D. 485, 490-91 (D.N.J. 1960) ; cf. Union Oil Co. v. Morton, 56 F.R.D.
643, 644 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Conway Import Co. v. United States, 40 F.R.D. 5, 8 (E.D.N.Y.
1966). But see SEC v. Shasta Minerals & Chem. Co., 36 F.R.D. 23, 25 (D. Utah 1964).
28. Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 57 F.R.D. 133, 138 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
29. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ; Carl Zeiss, 40 F.R.D. at 327.
30. See Swanner v. United States, 406 F.2d 716, 719 (Sth Cir. 1969).
31. See cases cited note 21 supra. In addition, the court should also consider the possibility
of requiring a "factual abstract" before deciding what is "inextricable." Nixon v. Sirica, 487
F.2d 700, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Partial discovery may be permitted even in military secrets
cases. See Committee for Nuclear Respons., Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
32. Carl Zeiss, 40 F.R.D. at 331-32. Such inspection may also be necessary to determine
relevance. See, e.g., Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1367 (1st Cir. 1972).
33. Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 57 F.R.D. 133, 137-38 (E.D. Wis. 1972);
Carl Zeiss, 40 F.R.D. at 331-32; SEC v. Shasta Minerals & Chem. Co., 36 F.R.D. 23, 24-25
(D. Utah 1964); Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 947 (CL
Cl. 1958).
34. The Reynolds case ruled that when there is "reasonable danger" that privileged matter
is present, the court should not insist on in camera inspection. 345 U.S. at 8-10. However, in
that case, plaintiff's need was "dubious" because of the availability of other means of
adducing the same facts without disclosing military secrets. Id. at 10-11. Whether in camera
inspection of information allegedly containing secrets of state may ever be justified is not
settled. 8 Wigmore § 2379, at 810 & n.4.
35. Carl Zeiss, 40 F.R.D. at 331-32.
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readily use such inspection to determine the applicability of the official informa-
tion privilege,36 to direct separation of privileged and nonprivileged matter,37 or
to compare a complete document with the government's version that excludes
privileged sections.Y5
Claims of official information privilege for law enforcement records in civil
actions are, of course, subject to the foregoing principles. Thus, factual reports
in the files of a law enforcement body are generally not privileged. 8 One pos-
sible exception relates to whether the files are part of an open or closed criminal
investigation. If the investigation is dosed, and related prosecutions are com-
pleted, the files of the investigation are generally discoverable. 40 However, if
the investigation is not completed, it may be necessary to prevent premature
disclosure of the names of potential defendants or of the government's evidence
in general. 41 This open/closed distinction is not a hard-and-fast rule, but is a
36. See, e.g., Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 713-14 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Committee for
Nuclear Respons., Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788, 794 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Brown v. United
States, 58 F.R.D. 599, 603 (D.S.C. 1973); Simons-Eastern Co. v. United States, 55 F.R.D.
88 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Wood v. Breier, 54 F.R.D. 7, 9-10 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Rosee v. Board
of Trade, 36 F.R.D. 684, 687 (N.D. Ill. 1965),
37. See, e.g., Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggesball, 280 F.2d 654, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
Union Oil Co. v. Morton, 56 F.R.D. 643, 644 (C.D. Cal. 1972); O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 38
F.R.D. 329, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 25 F.R.D. 485,
491-92 (D.N.J. 1960).
38. Union Oil Co. v. Morton, 56 F.R.D. 643, 644 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
39. See Ballard v. Terrak, 56 F.R.D. 45, 46 (E.D. WIs. 1972) (routine police records are
not privileged); cf. Mackey v. United States, 351 F.2d 794, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Black v.
Sheraton Corp. of America, 50 F.R.D. 130, 133 (D.D.C. 1970) (FBI investigatory material
held privileged because plaintiff did not show sufficient need and already possessed "all of
the information obtained directly from the surveillance complained of"). Contra, Kott v.
Perini, 283 F. Supp. 1 (ND. Ohio 1968). Of course, police reports may be protected as trial
preparation materials or by the work-product rule. See Wooten v. United States, 48 F.R.D.
296, 298 (N.D. Ga. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 437 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1971). The Freedom of
Information Act exempts "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to
the extent available by law to a party other than an agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970).
As is the case with exemption (5) of the Act (see note 23 supra), disclosure to the public Is
determined by reference to another body of law. The Act was not Intended to give any
"greater" or "earlier" access to investigatory files compiled for civil or criminal enforcement
proceedings than the party would get directly in such proceedings. Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d
813, 817 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d
935, 939 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970). But greater access Is available to a
private litigant under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when the litigant's
need is considered, than under the Act, when it is not. See Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813,
818 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972). Closed investigatory files may be available
to the public under the Freedom of Information Act; the cases holding to the contrary have
involved informers, whose identity may be privileged under Rule 26 as well. See Note, The
Freedom of Information Act-The Parameters of the Exemptions, 62 Geo. L.J. 177, 200-05
(1973) ; 47 Tul. L. Rev. 1136 (1973) ; note 13 supra.
40. See, e.g., Wood v. Breier, 54 F.R.D. 7, 11 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
41. See Philadelphia Resistance v. Mitchell, 58 F.R.D. 139 (ED. Pa. 1972); Capitol
Vending Co. v. Baker, 35 F.R.D. 510 (D.D.C. 1964).
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matter of judicial discretion.42 In addition, partial disclosure that would not
jeopardize the investigation should be considered 3 Furthermore, the govern-
ment cannot prevent discovery indefinitely by asserting that an investigation is
still continuing, for every investigation has a "reasonable terminus." 44
A second exception to the rule that factual data, as opposed to evaluations, is
discoverable has been found when the requested documents were part of an in-
vestigation to determine the appropriateness of police disciplinary proceedings.4 5
The basis is the public interest in encouraging internal government self-evalua-
tion and improvement; 46 the possibility of discovery of such internal reports
allegedly impairs the process by its chilling effect on candid reporting.47 The
better view is that where the documents are purely factual, the underlying policy
could not be contravened, and discovery should be ordered.i 8 Where, however,
a claim of privilege was not properly supported by affidavit of the department
head, and where the government did not establish that secrecy rather than dis-
closure would promote prompt and honest internal investigation, evaluative, as
well as factual, reports of an internal investigation have been ordered produced.40
Factors relating to the potential harm to the public interest in allowing dis-
covery must be weighed against the litigant's need, 0 and the nature of the action
itself may be crucial. For example, in a civil rights action against policemen for
wrongful death or police brutality, investigative reports are likely to have been
made immediately following the incident. They, therefore, will represent the
most reliable information availabler 1 since comparable data will become more
42. See Brown v. Thompson, 430 F.2d 1214, 1217 (5th Cir. 1970).
43. Philadelphia Resistance v. Mitchell, 58 F.R.D. 139, 143 (ED. Pa. 1972).
44. Capitol Vending Co. v. Baker, 35 F.R.D. 510, 511 (D.D.C. 1964); see Brown v.
Thompson, 430 F.2d 1214, 1215 (5th Cir. 1970); Cooney v. Sun Shipbldg. & Drydock Co.,
288 F. Supp. 708, 711-12 (ED. Pa. 1968) ; cf. Gaison v. Scott, 59 F.R.D. 347, 353 (D. Hawaii
1973).
45. Ballard v. Terrak, 56 F.R.D. 45 (ED. Wis. 1972). In Gaison v. Scott, 59 F.R.D. 347
(D. Hawaii 1973), the court denied discovery of an open investigation to determine whether
disciplinary proceedings would be instituted. The court added that the discovery request could
be renewed "at an appropriate time if reasonably necessary for the prosecution of [the]
case." Id. at 353. Since the decision applies the "fact or evaluation" and "open or closed
investigation" guidelines to the internal as well as the external investigation, it suggests that
a dosed investigation of this type would be discoverable, and a stronger showing of need
could overcome the privilege protecting the factual (and possibly the evaluative) aspects of
an open internal investigation. Id. at 351-53.
46. See Ballard v. Terrak, 56 F.R.D. 45, 46 (ED. Wis. 1972). For a discussion of the
trend toward recognizing privileges for self-evaluative reports se 57 Minn. L. Rev. 807
(1973).
47. Ballard v. Terrak, 56 F.R.D. 45, 46 (E.D. Wis. 1972). But see Gaison v. Scott, 59
F.RD. 347, 352 (D. Hawaii 1973); Carter v. Carlson, 56 F.RD. 9, 11 (D.D.C. 1972); Wood
v. Breier, 54 F.R.D. 7, 12-13 (ED. Wis. 1972).
48. Wood v. Breier, 54 F.R.D. 7 (ED. Wis. 1972).
49. Carter v. Carlson, 56 F.R.D. 9 (D.D.C. 1972).
50. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
51. Wood v. Breier, 54 F.RD. 7, 10 (ED. Wis. 1972); see Gaison v. Scott, 59 F.R.
347, 352 (D. Hawaii 1973).
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and more difficult to obtain, with the passage of time, by other discovery devices.
The investigatory file is even more critical to the citizen's case where the in-
vestigative methods themselves are allegedly violative of the plaintiff's rights.02
The need of such a plaintiff for the information would thus present a strong
argument for discovery. At the same time, however, the investigation may be
open and continuing when the civil rights action is brought, and the plaintiff
may well be a potential defendant in a criminal action. The court's balancing
must then allow the plaintiff the information needed to litigate a valid claim,
while not jeopardizing the government's efforts to prosecute law violators. 5
Should the possibility exist that the civil action was brought merely to gain ac-
cess to the investigatory files, discovery may be granted, but only to the extent
that it would not jeopardize the government's investigation. 54 In camera inspec-
tion would, in such a case, seem to be the best aid to a just determination.5
Also weighing on the plaintiff's side---quite apart from a general public interest
in redressing wrongs and arriving at a just determination in private litigation-
are several public policies militating against the exclusion of evidence under
claim of privilege. First, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate liberal
discovery in each case; 50 "[ojnly strong public policies weigh against dis-
closure." 57 Arguments against suppression also inhere in the civil rights statute.58
Section 1983 permits private vindication of fundamental rights in that it allows
the individual citizen to enforce the fourteenth amendment.59 "Thus, it is of
special import that suits brought under this statute be resolved by a determina-
tion of the truth rather than by a determination that the truth shall remain
hidden." 60 Finally, in suits involving alleged official misconduct, discovery of
documents that might otherwise be found privileged "may well be proper"0 1
when the request has "a reasonable basis ... and.., the defendant government
agents played some part in the operative events. 062
52. Philadelphia Resistance v. Mitchell, 58 F.R.D. 139, 143 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
53. Id. at 144-45.
54. Id. at 143-45.
55. Id.
56. See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 121 (1964); United States v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-01, 507-08
(1947). Civil rights actions in which this policy has been given weight in a privilege deter-
mination include: Gaison v. Scott, 59 F.R.D. 347, 351-52 (D. Hawaii 1973); Carter v. Carl-
son, 56 F.R.D. 9, 11 (D.D.C. 1972) ; Wood v. Breier, 54 F.R.D. 7, 10 (ED. Wis. 1972).
57. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958); see Freeman v.
Seligson, 405 F.2d 1326, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
58. Wood v. Breier, 54 F.R.D. 7, 10 (ED. Wis. 1972).
59. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961); see, e.g., Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272,
278-79 (3d Cir. 1972); Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18, 24 (N.D. Cal. 1973);
Wood v. Breier, 54 F.R.D. 7, 10-11 (E.D. Wis. 1972); cf. Newman v. Piggle Park Enterpr.,
Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1968); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1201
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496,
499 (Sth Cir. 1968).
60. Wood v. Breier, 54 F.R.D. 7, 11 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
61. Id. at 12.
62. Rosee v. Board of Trade, 36 F.R.D. 684, 690 (N.D. IMI. 1965); see Wood v. Breler,
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This is the framework within which to evaluate the considerations deemed by
the FrankenhauserG3 court to be pertinent in the context of a discovery motion
concerning police investigative files in a civil rights action. These factors were:
(1) the extent to which disclosure will thwart governmental processes by discouraging
citizens from giving the government information; (2) the impact upon persons who
have given information of having their identities disclosed; (3) the degree to which
governmental self-evaluation and consequent program improvement will be chilled by
disclosure; (4) whether the information sought is factual data or evaluative summary;
(5) whether the party seeking the discovery is an actual or potential defendant in any
criminal proceeding either pending or reasonably likely to follow from the incident in
question; (6) whether the police investigation has been completed; (7) whether any
intradepartmental disciplinary proceedings have arisen or may arise from the investi-
gation; (8) whether the plaintiff's suit is non-frivolous and brought in good faith; (9)
whether the information sought is available through other discovery or from other
sources; and (10) the importance of the information sought to the plaintiff's case.G4
The first two of these considerations were whether disclosure would discourage
citizens from giving information, and whether any unfavorable impact on those
who have given information would be the result of disclosure.e5 In essence, the
court itself revealed the inappropriateness of these two considerations as part of
a general formula. It concluded that the rare instances of disclosure in litigation
after application of a balancing test would deter neither citizen nor police co-
operation in an investigation; and that no impact on witnesses was likely to
result from disclosure of their statements in an investigation of a shooting.00 In
fact, the concerns expressed by the court suggest the underlying policies of the
informer's privilege (i.e., fostering the flow of information to the government
by preserving the anonymity of informers) ;67 but eyewitnesses, not informers,
were involved in this case. 68 Where the informer's privilege is pertinent, its de-
termination is independent of any "executive" or "official information" privilege
determination.
As third and fourth considerations, the court added: whether governmental
self-evaluation and program improvement will be "chilled by disclosure,"G0 and
whether the requested information is factual or evaluative.10 Of course, the facts
vs. evaluation distinction is but a starting point of inquiry, and not necessarily
a corresponding division of nonprivileged and privileged material.' By limiting
discovery to factual data, i.e., permitting excision of opinions, recommendations,
and evaluative summaries, the court in Frankenhauser was confident that it was
54 F.R.D. 7, 12 (EMI. Wis. 1972); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 25 F.R.D. 485,
490 (D.N.J. 1960); Zimmerman v. Poindexter, 74 F. Supp. 933, 935 (D. Hawaii 1947).
63. Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
64. Id. at 344.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See note 13 supra.
68. 59 F.R.D. at 340.
69. Id. at 344.
70. Id.
71. See notes 21-29 supra and accompanying text.
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not revealing any "details of police self-evaluation"; 72 that disclosure of the
excluded material would "chill" self-improvement was, therefore, accepted with-
out specific evidential support and without examination of the documents.70 This
is somewhat inconsistent with the court's acceptance of the view that strong
public policies favor disclosure in civil rights actions.7 4 From that position
logically should have followed the closest scrutiny of the privilege claim: in
camera inspection to confirm that disclosure would in fact be harmful to the
public interest.75 The argument for in camera inspection is more compelling be-
cause of the "special danger" in permitting an official charged with misconduct
"to define the scope of his own privilege, free of supervision by the courts,"70 by,
for example, arbitrarily categorizing matter as opinion, recommendation, or eval-
uation.
Additional balancing elements suggested were whether (a) the investigation
was completed; (b) the party seeking discovery was an actual or potential de-
fendant in a criminal action pending or likely to follow from the incident; and
(c) intra-departmental disciplinary proceedings have arisen or may arlse.7 7 Since
the investigations in Frankenhauser had been closed for two years, and none of
the plaintiffs was an actual or potential defendant in a related case, and no dis-
ciplinary proceedings were in progress or expected, these considerations revealed
no obstacles to discovery.78 However, the court clearly did not intend to imply
that parts of an open investigation were never discoverable, since it acknowl-
edged that there may be instances in which discovery would indeed be possible.'0
Of course, the possibility of criminal actions or disciplinary proceedings is a
necessary and important concern in every case.80
Whether the suit is nonfrivolous and brought in good faith was also to be a
factor in the discovery decision, according to Frankenhausef.81 This criterion
was satisfied by "a reading of the complaint [which revealed] that its allegations
are substantial and that [the suit] was apparently brought in good faith.181
Undoubtedly the court's intention in suggesting this element was to emphasize
72. 59 F.R.D. at 344-45.
73. In Carter v. Carlson, 56 F.R.D. 9 (D.D.C. 1972), the court examined the evaluative
summaries in camera and ruled them discoverable. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
74. 59 F.R.f. at 343-44; see text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
75. In Gaison v. Scott, 59 F.R.D. 347 (D. Hawaii 1973), the court limited discovery to
factual police records, but added: "If the City believes that portions of the police reports
contain evaluative summaries or recommendations that should not be discovered, the reports
may be submitted to the court for in camera inspection prior to delivery to plaintiff." Id.
at 353.
76. Carr v. Monroe Mfg. Co., 431 F.2d 384, 389 (sth Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 400 U.S.
1000 (1971). In Frankenhauser, the Police Commissioner was a defendant. 50 F.R.D. at 340
n.la.
77. 59 F.R.D. at 344.
78. Id. at 345.
79. Id. at 343-44.
80. See text accompanying notes 41-49 & 53 supra.
81. 59 F.R.D. at 344.
82. Id. at 345.
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the danger of unwarranted disclosure in suits brought merely for the purpose of
gaining access to criminal investigatory files by actual or potential defendants,
or for the purpose of searching out a cause of action through discovery.83
Lastly, Frankenhauser suggested that the court must consider the plaintiff's
need for the information and whether the data sought is available through other
discovery or from other sources.8 4 Applying these considerations to the facts at
hand, the court concluded:
Plaintiffs' need for the facts contained in the police investigative files is manifest. The
police investigation was conducted promptly after the incident occurred and certainly
should be comprehensive and reliable. Most of the eyewitnesses to the shooting were
police officers, and the widow and children had no means to duplicate the police in-
vestigation. Interviews or depositions at this late date (were not a substitute] ....
The discovery sought is not only of extreme importance to plaintiffs' case; it may
indeed be the sole repository of their prospects of success.85
Therefore, a police investigative report on an incident that is the subject of a
civil rights suit is of necessity extremely important to a plaintiff and has no
equivalent alternative.8 6
Although Frankenhauser does not provide a flawless formula, it does suggest
some of the principal concerns in resolving a claim of official information priv-
ilege when properly raised. Any proposed approach for assessing a claim of this
privilege in a civil rights action against police should recognize that police files
will always be of extreme importance to the plaintiff's case.87 The analysis must
also reflect the special public interest in a just determination of civil rights ac-
tions.88 Such an approach should recognize the nature of privileges as exceptions
to the rule that "the public ... has a right to every man's evidence, ' 9 and the
fact that the scope of any privilege is "limited by its underlying purpose.' °
Consequently, when there is no showing that disclosure will be injurious to the
public interest, no privilege applies 1 Recognition of this nature of privileges
would seem to demand a presumption9 2 against them, which, in instances in-
83. Similar concerns have been expressed by other courts. Brown v. Thompson, 430 F.2d
1214, 1217-18 (5th Cir. 1970) (dissenting opinion); Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478,
490-92 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963) ; Philadelphia Resistance v. Mitchell,
58 F.R.D. 139, 144 (E.M. Pa. 1972). See also Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Comm. v. Gray, 480
F.2d 326, 333 (2d Cir. 1973).
84. 59 F.R.D. at 344.
85. Id. at 345.
86. See text accompanying notes 51 & 52 supra.
87. See text accompanying notes 51-52, 85 & 86 supra.
88. See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
89. 8 Wigmore § 2192.
90. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60 (1957) ; see cases cited notes 24-25, 43 & 48
supra.
91. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87-88 (1973) ; see cases cited notes 25, 48 & 49 supra; Mor-
gan, Foreword to Model Code of Evidence at 7 (1942); 8 Wigmore § 2192; cf. Roviaro v.
United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60 (1957).
92. 8 Wigmore § 2192.
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volving the official information privilege in civil rights actions, should not be
considered as rebutted without a specific statement of the public policies war-
ranting nondisclosure, and a showing that discovery in the particular circum-
stances of the case would undermine those policies.93
With these factors favoring discovery in every civil rights action against police
officers, the following guidelines seem an appropriate revision of the Franken-
hauser list. Factual materials are discoverable, unless they are part of an open
criminal investigation, or an internal review to determine the propriety of disci-
plinary proceedings. But, before an official information privilege can be recog-
nized in the latter instances, the requested discovery must be shown to thwart
the government's investigative purpose, 94 or to hamper the self-evaluation pro-
cess.95 Evaluative material is not automatically precluded from discovery;
disclosure must be shown to conflict with the underlying policies favoring non-
disclosure,9 6 which must clearly outweigh the litigant's need.97 Partial discovery,
to the extent it will not contravene those policies, should be ordered in every
case where the privilege claim is found to have validity.08 Furthermore, an
allegedly open investigation cannot be characterized as such indefinitely; there
must be a reasonable termination date." Finally, in camera inspection should
be freely used in all but the most obvious cases to protect against the unnecessary
suppression of the truth. 00
Mary C. Mono
Securities-Rule lOb-5-Non-Purchaser-Seller with a Vital Stake in the
Outcome of a Dispute Involving Fraud in Connection with the Purchase
or Sale of Securities Has Standing to Sue.-Bank Service Corporation pur-
chased a car leasing company. The corporation issued 7,000 shares of stock to the
seller, and the plaintiff-shareholders personally guaranteed certain liabilities as-
sumed by Bank Service. The leasing business failed, and the plaintiffs filed suit
under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1 and Securities
and Exchange Commission rule 10b-5,2 alleging that the value of the assets
93. See cases cited notes 19, 24 & 49 supra.
94. See Philadelphia Resistance v. Mitchell, 58 F.R.D. 139, 143 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
95. Gaison v. Scott, 59 F.R.D. 347, 352 (D. Hawaii 1973); Carter v. Carlson, 56 F.R.D.
9, 11 (D.D.C. 1972); Wood v. Breier, 54 F.R.D. 7, 10-11 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
96. See notes 24-25 & 49 supra and accompanying text.
97. See cases cited note 29 supra.
98. See cases cited notes 31 & 43 supra.
99. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
100. See notes 32-38 & 55 supra and accompanying text.
1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), makes it unlawful
for any person "[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
... any manipulative or deceptive device. ..."
2. Rule 10b-S provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifico
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acquired by Bank Service had been misrepresented by the defendants. The dis-
trict court dismissed the third amended complaint because plaintiffs were not
sellers of securities and therefore lacked standing to sue. The Seventh Circuit
agreed that plaintiffs were not sellers or purchasers of securities; nevertheless, it
discarded the purchaser-seller requirement and reinstated the complaint. Eason
v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., [Current Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
11 94,344 (7th Cir., Dec. 28, 1973), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3511
(U.S. Feb. 28, 1974) (No. 73-1323).
The purchaser-seller standing requirement originated in Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp.,3 wherein the Second Circuit refused to grant standing under sec-
tion 10(b) and rule 10b-5 to minority stockholders who claimed that a sale of
the controlling interest in the corporation, accompanied by fraud, diminished
the value of their stock. Since the complainants were not "sellers" the action
was dismissed. Courts and commentators faced with the Birnbaum rule con-
tinue to struggle to apply or avoid it.4
Since this requirement has received detailed treatment elsewhereG only a
cursory review of its development will be undertaken here. The strict purchaser-
seller rule is satisfied when one purchases or sells securities the value of which
has been misrepresented. 6 The courts have developed several modifications to
the strict Birnbaum requirement. Since the Securities Exchange Act defines a
purchase or sale to include a contract to purchase or sell,7 several courts have
held that one who alleges that a contract for the purchase or sale of securities
was breached fraudulently has a lob-5 claim as an aborted purchaser-seller.8
to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice,
or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).
3. 193 F.2d 461,464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
4. See, e.g., Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 522 (8th Cir. 1973) ; Mount
Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 341 (9th Cir. 1972); Kellogg, The Inability to
Obtain Analytical Precision Where Standing to Sue Under Rule lOb-S Is Involved, 20 Buffalo
L. Rev. 93 (1970); Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule
10b-5, 54 Va. L. Rev. 268 (1968); Note, 10b-S Standing Under Birnbaum: The Case of the
Missing Remedy, 24 Hastings L.J. 1007 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, lob-S Standing];
Comment, The Birnbaum Doctrine-An Aging Rule Reexamined by the Courts, 22 Syracuse
L. Rev. 715 (1971). A definitive study of rule 10b-S is that of A. Bromberg, Securities Law:
Fraud-SEC Rule 10b-5 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Bromberg].
5. See sources cited note 4 supra.
6. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 548 (D. Utah 1970),
modified sub nom. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1004 (1971). Note, 10b-5 Standing, supra note 4, at 1010.
7. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a) (13)-(14), 15 US.C. § 78c(a) (13)-(14) (1970).
8. Walling v. Beverly Enterprises, 476 F.2d 393, 396 (9th Cir. 1973); Opper v. Hancock
Sec. Corp., 367 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1966) (per curiam); Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 26S
F. Supp. 440, 444-45 (N.D. Il. 1967); cf. Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F.
Supp. 715, 718-19 (S.E-N.Y. 1968).
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Furthermore, one who has not sold securities at the time of suit but who, after
a rule lOb-5 violation, is left holding stock which he must sell, may have
grounds to sue under some circumstances as a forced sellerY The requirement
also is eroded by including within the meaning of purchase and sale a merger, 10
by permitting beneficial owners of securities which are bought or sold to sue,11
and by granting a right of action to holders of irrevocable options who fail to
exercise them.12 Finally, the purchaser-seller rule is relaxed considerably when
a claim is made for injunctive relief, rather than for damages.13
Courts have put forth several justifications for the judicially-created 4 pur-
chaser-seller requirement. On the one hand, they argue that rule lOb-5 was not
intended to provide protection against acts of corporate mismanagement. 16 On
the other hand, some judges opine that the standing requirement is simply that
which is constitutionally mandated.' 6 Others suggest that Congress did not in-
tend to grant a right of action to non-purchaser-sellers.' 7 Commentators have
suggested convincingly that its real purpose is to provide an ascertainable stan-
dard for proof of damages.' 8 In addition, an injured party may seek relief under
9. See, e.g., Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 521-22 (8th Cir. 1973) (merger
accomplished without tender offer to plaintiff; plaintiff is forced seller); Dudley v. South-
eastern Factor & Fin. Corp., 446 F.2d 303, 307 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971)
(corporation liquidated common stock without liquidating plaintiff's preferred stock); Crane
Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 791-94 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 822 (1970) (antitrust considerations require plaintiff to dispose of stock; plaintiff is
forced seller) ; Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 633 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
970 (1967) (short form merger; plaintiff is forced seller). But cf. Iroquois Indus., Inc. v.
Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970).
10. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 467 (1969); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp.,
380 F.2d 262, 268-69 (7th Cir.) (Fairchild & Cummings, JJ., concurring), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 977 (1967).
11. James v. Gerber Prod. Co., 483 F.2d 944, 948 (6th Cir. 1973); Dracbman v. Harvey,
453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc) (shares held in street name; plaintiff has standing).
12. See Ashton v. Thornley Realty Co., 346 F. Supp. 1294, 1299 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
aff'd mem., 471 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1973).
13. Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 813 (5th Cir. 1970); Britt v. Cyril Bath Co., 417
F.2d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 1969) ("the requirements of causation and reliance are not so strong
in a private action to enjoin continuing violations of Section 10(b) and Rule lob-S.");
Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 547 (2d Cir. 1967); Tully v. Mott
Supermkts., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834, 841 (D.N.J. 1972); cf. Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d
161, 173 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970) (allowing suit for attorneys' fees after
action became moot). See also 60 Geo. L.J. 1605 (1972).
14. See Note, 10b-5 Standing, supra note 4, at 1032.
15. Id. at 1033; see notes 72, 83 infra and accompanying text.
16. See note 47 infra and accompanying text.
17. See note 66 infra and accompanying text.
18. "Problems of proof... may explain in large measure the willingnes,., to grant
standing [in some cases] while denying it under similar facts [in others]." Kellogg, The
Inability to Obtain Analytical Precision Where Standing to Sue Under Rule lob-5 Is In-
volved, 20 Buffalo L. Rev. 93, 115 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
CASE NOTES
other available remedies.10 Notwithstanding these rationales, the federal courts
dearly have "whittled away"20 the Birnbaum requirement; however, Eason v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp.21 is the first case explicitly to reject it.
In Eason, the court assumed "[f]or purposes of decision"2 that the only pur-
chase or sale of a security which transpired was the issuance of the 7,000 shares
of stock by Bank Service. The court "reject[ed] the suggestion that plaintiffs
should be characterized as 'sellers' of that stock" -3 and squarely faced the issue
of whether, "notwithstanding the fact that they were neither purchasers nor
sellers of a security, plaintiffs may obtain relief under Rule l0b-5. 24 In decid-
ing the issue in the affirmative, the court held that "the purchaser-seller limita-
tion . . . is not part of the law of this circuit."- 5
In discarding the purchaser-seller requirement, the court posed three ques-
tions: "(a) whether [plaintiffs] have 'standing,' (b) whether they are protected
by the rule, and (c) whether overriding considerations of policy should defeat
their claim.1'*2
In holding that plaintiffs did have standing, the court refused to consider
whether their "relationship to defendant's violation of Rule lOb-5 . . . deter-
mines whether the plaintiff is a person who has suffered a legal wrong."2 t Rather,
the opinion viewed standing as raising "a jurisdictional question under Article
I of the United States Constitution." 8 Under this approach, standing is
achieved if the plaintiff "has a sufficient interest in a real controversy with the
defendant to entitle him to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court,'*9 i.e.,
a "vital stake in the outcome of the dispute." 30
In holding that plaintiffs were protected by rule lOb-5, and therefore "were
members of the class for whose special benefit Rule 10b-5 was adopted," 3' the
court noted the general erosion of the Birnbaum doctrine.32 The language of
19. E.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(c) (1970), does not
contain a purchaser-seller requirement for suits involving tender offers under its provisions.
See, e.g., H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 353 F. Supp. 153, 162 (D.R.1. 1972), affd,
482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973). State tort law remedies also are available in many instances.
See Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, S0S (5th Cir. 1970).
20. 2 Bromberg § 8.8 at 222.1; see notes 7-13 supra and accompanying text.
21. [Current Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. f 94,344 (7th Cir., Dec. 28, 1973) [herein-
after cited by page as Current CCH Binder].
22. Id. at 95,160.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 95,164 (footnote omitted). Upon circulation to all judges in regular active
service in the circuit, no judge requested a hearing en banc. Id. at 95,164 n.31.
26. Id. at 95,160.
27. Id. at 95,161 (footnote omitted).
28. Id. (footnote omitted).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 95,162.
32. Id. See notes 4-13 supra and accompanying text.
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the SEC rule, which speaks of a fraud or deceit upon any person, coupled with
Supreme Court pronouncements favoring a liberal construction of the Securities
Exchange Act,33 led the court to conclude that
the rule extends to persons who, in their capacity as investors, suffer significant injury
as a direct consequence of fraud in connection with a securities transaction, even
though their participation in the transaction did not involve either the purchase or the
sale of a security. 4
Thus the plaintiffs, as "direct parties" 35 and "as investors and as principals"30
were protected by the rule.
Finally, the court found no policy considerations to defeat plaintiffs' claim
for standing. The potential increase in federal litigation, often put forward as a
justification by proponents of the Birnbaum requirement, 7 carried little weight
for the Seventh Circuit: "[W]e may not for that reason reject what we believe
to be a correct interpretation of the statute or the rule."3 8 Similarly, the court did
not worry about inconsistencies among the circuits. 9
Eason is a landmark decision in securities law but, while "burying" Birnbaum,
it does not replace it with new guidelines.
Either a "target area" or a "direct injury" analysis would seem preferable to a some-
what tattered purchaser-seller rubric. In any event, we deliberately avoid the tempta-
tion to try to formulate a succinct substitute for Birnbaum, trusting that the appro-
priate limits to the rule will best be defined through the process of case by case
adjudication. 4o
The court was unsure of the consequences of its opinion, but stated that a
plaintiff still "will have to demonstrate membership in the 'special class' pro-
tected by Rule lob-5 ... ,"4 Thus, in general terms, the Seventh Circuit will
grant standing where (1) there is "a fraud or deceit upon any person, in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security," 42 (2) the plaintiff has the
33. Current CCH Binder at 95,162-63.
34. Id. at 95,163.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. fI 94,191 at 94,824 (9th Cir., Oct. 15, 1973) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
But see Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 645, 673
(1973): "When the 'floodgates' of litigation are opened to some new class of controversy by a
decision, it is notable how rarely one can discern the flood that the dissenters feared."
38. Current CCH Binder at 95,164. The court also noted that the Securities and E.xchange
Commission had for years felt the purchaser-seller limitation was inconsistent with rule
10b-5 and that the SEC has the power to deal with any unforeseen consequences of the
rejection of the purchaser-seller rule. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 95,164 n.29.
41. Id. at 95,164.
42. See note 2 supra.
[Vol. 42
"status as an investor" 43 and (3) "injury [is] a direct consequence of the
alleged violation.""4
One major difficulty with the Eason decision is that it does not disclose what
weight the court gave to the fact that the plaintiffs, in addition to being share-
holders, also guaranteed certain liabilities assumed by Bank Service.4 5 This was
quite probably the decisive factor. Consequently, the decision can be viewed
as making the ability to prove harm a major factor in a rule lob-5 suit. °
While the Eason opinion is deliberately vague in suggesting the future scope
of a section 10(b) claim, nevertheless its basic approach to the standing problem
should have precedential value. The court limited its use of the term "stand-
ing" to what commentators denominate as Article III or "threshold" standing.' 7
To meet this standing requirement, a plaintiff must have the "personal stake
and interest that impart the concrete adverseness required by Article III.'"48
An apparent second element of constitutional standing enunciated by the Su-
preme Court-that the plaintiff show that he is "arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute"49-was not discussed ex-
plicitly by the court. The "zone of interest" standing test has been criticized . 0
43. Current CCH Binder at 95,163.
44. Id. at 95,164.
45. Id. at 95,159.
46. By making personal guarantees, the plaintiffs showed that they intended to be bene-
fited by the transactions and that they personally relied on representations made to them-
selves and Bank Service. Since they can show a direct link between their investment decision
and the sale of securities, they arguably can "leap the causation hurdle" and show proof of
damages. See Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 94,191 at 94,824 (9th Cir., Oct 15, 1973) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting) ; se
note 18 supra.
47. See Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate
for Claim for Relief, 83 Yale L.J. 425, 425-26 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Albert]. The
constitutional argument is raised in Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (Sth Cir. 1970). How-
ever, that court appeared to reject that approach in favor of a legal harm approach, the
issue being viewed as whether the injury is "of the type that the Act seeks to prevent"
Id. at 805. It appears that the apparent rejection of the constitutional view was misconstrued
by the Ninth Circuit in Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F2d 339, 343 (9th Cir.
1972). In the same vein, the Eason assumption that the Birnbaum rule was based upon
constitutional standing appears incorrect; the court was correct in holding that a constitu-
tional standing approach to the rule is "unwarranted." Current CCH Binder at 95,161.
48. Barlow v. Colins, 397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970). See also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
99-101 (1968) ; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204. (1962).
49. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) (dealing
with standing under the Administrative Procedure Act). The remainder of the textual dis-
cussion will frequently analogize to the Court's approach to standing in Data Processing.
See generally Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 450 (1970) [here-
inafter cited as Davis].
5o. "In short, zone of interest standing is not a screen that serves any purpose that is not
better served by the requirement of protected legal interest as part of a claim for relief."
Albert 497. It has been characterized as "cumbersome, inconvenient, and artificial." Davis
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and it appears to have no place in securities law, where anyone who is an
investor or potential investor appears capable of meeting its requirement.
When Eason turned to the issue of whether plaintiffs were "members of the
class for whose special benefit Rule lob-5 was adopted,'*1 it refrained from
using the term "standing." While the discussion might be viewed as an analysis
of the second element of constitutional standing (zone of interests), it is more
likely that the court recognized that it had left the realm of constitutional
standing entirely. It is submitted that this was an analytically correct ap-
proach. 52 Unfortunately, however, the Eason court failed to be explicit in dis-
cussing the nature of the class which is protected by rule l0b-5. Indeed, the
court's conclusion that the rule "extends to persons ... even though their par-
ticipation in the transaction did not involve either the purchase or the sale of
a security," 53 appears to reintroduce the question--" [whether] the plaintiff's
status-that is to say, his relationship to defendant's violation of Rule 10b-S-
really determines whether the plaintiff is a person who has suffered a legal
wrong" 54-that the court declined to consider under the "standing" rubric. This
suggests that the court really was considering what confusingly"5 and unfor-
tunately has been denominated as "legal interest standing."50 One who lacks
"legal interest standing" "fail [s] to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted." 57
"The 'legal interest' test goes to the merits."58 This, rather than constitu-
tional standing, is the crux of the Birnbaum approach to rule lob-5. The Su-
preme Court has stated:
[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
458. One author has suggested that the zone of interest has already been rejected by sub-
sequent Court cases with the result that "as a practical matter... the zone of interests test
[is] functionally irrelevant." Sedler, Standing, Justiciability, and All That: A Behavioral
Analysis, 25 Vand. L. Rev. 479, 486 (1972). Sedler convincingly suggests that "Injury in
fact" is sufficient for standing. Id.
51. Current CCH Binder at 95,162.
52. See note 50 supra.
53. Current CCH Binder at 95,163.
54. Id. at 95,161 (footnote omitted).
55. Cf. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137 (1939) (decided before
"standing" became a specialized entry in the legal lexicon).
56. Albert 428, citing Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also H. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View
(1973).
57. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6). "All of these are matters concerned with whether a plain-
tiff has stated a claim for relief; they are resolved by reference to the meaning and purposes
of the law relevant to the merits." Albert 429. See also 41 Fordham L. Rev. 742, 753 n.74
(1973).
58. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). "The
question of standing is different," Id. Cf. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 176 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring & dissenting).
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beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.59
Under Birnbaum, a plaintiff who could not allege that he had purchased or sold
securities was presumed unable to prove that he had been defrauded in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of securities. That is, he was held to have failed
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Eason, by construing the
"any person" language differently from Birnbaum,GO reached an opposite con-
clusion: it recognized that a legal wrong can occur to a purchaser, seller or
"investor";6 it freed the purchaser-seller rule from the shackles of standing;
and it correctly suggested that courts examine the nexus that the plaintiff
has to a fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security in consid-
ering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
Viewed from the perspective of securities regulation, the Seventh Circuit's
rejection of the purchaser-seller limitation and its emphasis on a flexible ap-
proach 62 seems to be in accord with the historical development of rule lob-5
and several recent court opinions. For example, in Manor Drug Stores v. Blue
Chip Stamps Corp.,63 the Ninth Circuit reinstated a complaint of a plaintiff who
alleged that he would have purchased stock from defendants but for their mis-
representations. The decision was based on the court's conclusion that plaintiff
had the "functional equivalent of [a] contractual relationship"8 4 and that this
in turn furnished proof of harm.6 5 While the purchaser-seller rule was not ex-
pressly rejected, a strong dissent argued that "[a] ppellants do not have standing
because they are outside the class to whom Congress intended to extend the
right to bring federal damage actions when it enacted section 10(b). I'"
The Eason and the Blue Chip majority approaches arguably find support in
other circuits. In James v. Gerber Products Co.)8 7 the Sixth Circuit sustained
a refusal to dismiss for failure to state a claim by a beneficiary of a testamentary
59. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (footnote omitted).
60. Compare 193 F.2d at 463 with Current CCH Binder at 95,162.
61. Current CCH Binder at 95,163. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
62. "A flexible statute which emphasizes the relevance of the context in which a trans-
action takes place should neither limit its protection to an arbitrarily defined class of pur-
chasers and sellers, nor arbitrarily assume that every purchaser and every seller is entitled
to precisely the same disclosure." Current CCH Binder at 95,163 n28. "We believe that
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 prohibit all fraudulent schemes .... Novel or atypical methods
should not provide immunity from the securities laws." A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375
F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967) (emphasis of court deleted).
63. [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep 9 94,191 at 94,824 (9th Cir., Oct. 15,
1973).
64. Id. at 94,820
65. Id.
66. Id. at 94,823 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). It has been suggested that courts giving
private rights of action under statutes like the Securities Exchange Act "have not relied upon
congressional intent." Albert 453.
67. 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973).
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trust. Although the appellant did not "claim that she took any action with re-
spect to the subject transactions nor that she had the power to do so, "' 8 never-
theless, she was allowed to sue under the rule since the court was "satisfied...
§ 10(b) ... is furthered and that we remain within the purpose of Birnbaum
to exclude corporate mismanagement suits unrelated to securities transactions in
the federal courts."09 Similarly, Heyman v. Heyman,70 a decision in the South-
ern District of New York, allowed a trust beneficiary to go to the merits. "Al-
though not the seller, she was one who immediately stood to gain or lose by
the sale; it was for her benefit . . . that the sale was made."71 Arguing that
Birnbaum merely excludes corporate mismanagement suits from section 10(b),
the court noted that the plaintiff "was the beneficiary of the sale. That is a
nexus missing in the line of cases which follow Birnbaum."72 This flexible ap-
proach to the purchaser-seller problem explains several recent decisions tinder
rule 10b-573 and arguably has Supreme Court support.74
The new approach has several advantages: it is more likely to effectuate the
policies of the Act; 75 it will provide plaintiffs with the procedural benefits of
federal courts; 76 and it should avoid restrictive state court approaches to suits
based on fraud.77 Since federal jurisdiction under the Securities Exchange Act is
68. Id. at 948.
69. Id. at 950 (footnote omitted). Typically, in the lower court, "[tjhe standing defenses
were treated as motions to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted under Rule 12(b) . . . ." Id. at 946.
70. 356 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
71. Id. at 965.
72. Id. But see Cox, Fraud Is in the Eyes of the Beholder: Rule lob-S's Application to
Acts of Corporate Mismanagement, 47 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 674, 698-700 (1972).
73. See, e.g., Jefferies & Co. v. Arkus-Duntov, 357 F. Supp. 1206, 1213 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
giving a broker standing on the grounds that he had become a forced purchaser as a result
of a stock fraud; Ashton v. Thornley Realty Co., 346 F. Supp. 1294, 1299 n.4 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), aff'd mem., 471 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1973), suggesting that the owner of an option to
purchase a "security" has standing, even if the option is not exercised. In Cambridge Capital
Corp. v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 350 F. Supp. 829, 834 (D. Minn. 1972), the court held
that the holder of a second security interest in some stock could, under certain circum-
stances, sue under § 10(b) since he was entitled to receive directly the proceeds of the sale
in excess of the claims of the first lienholder.
74. In SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), the Court suggested that a broad
view of the purchaser-seller rule would be accepted, stating that "we must ask whether
respondents' alleged conduct is the type of fraudulent behavior which was meant to be for-
bidden by the statute and the rule." Id. at 467. The Court did not rule directly on the
standing issue. Id. at 467 n.9. Nevertheless, Justice Harlan took the majority to task for
taking up the issue without hearing argument on it. Id. at 471-72 (Harlan, J., concurring
& dissenting).
75. See generally Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 Harv. L.
Rev. 1146 (1965); Ruder, Current Developments in the Federal Law of Corporate Fiduciary
Relations-Standing to Sue Under Rule 10b-5, 26 Bus. Law. 1289 (1971).
76. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (class actions) & 26-37 (liberal discovery).
77. See Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule 10b-5 Corporate Mismanage-
ment Cases, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1007, 1032 (1973). Of course, a progressive state court may
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exclusive,78 a broader construction of the purchaser-seller rule should permit a
complete adjudication of all claims in a single action.70 Finally, there is little
legislative history which would demonstrate that the purchaser-seller limitation
reflects a considered legislative judgment; 0 rather, the judicial history of the
Securities Exchange Act indicates that it is remedial legislation which is to be
liberally construed.8 '
The Eason approach leaves open the question of what factors will justify a
dismissal of a rule 10b-5 claim. Since almost all public misrepresentations by
corporations may operate as a fraud or deceit in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities,82 the opinion does not clarify how corporate mismanage-
ment suits can be excluded from the coverage of the rule as it has been held
they must.8 3 It is submitted that the purchaser-seller rule was effective in draw-
ing this distinction.8 4
Thus, it will be left to future courts to develop a new basis for limiting rule
10b-5 suits, particularly since other elements of such suits are being eroded."
The new attempt to delineate a basis for limiting actions under the rule probably
on occasion provide remedies which supplement gaps in the federal statutes. See 42 Fordham
L. Rev. 211, 215-16 (1973). Generally, however, the federal rules tend to be more liberal.
See, e.g., Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, 726-30 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc).
78. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970), gives federal courts
exclusive jurisdiction over suits arising under the Act.
79. Cf. United Mline Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (pendent jurisdiction).
Thus state law claims can be heard in the same suit with a § 10(b) action in a federal court,
while a state court hearing a claim of corporate mismanagement would not have jurisdiction
to hear an action based on a § 10(b) violation. See Beach v. KDI Corp., [Current Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 94,368 at 95,244 (3d Cir., Jan. 11, 1974).
80. See Note, lob-5 Standing, supra note 4, at 1011 n.18. Indeed, the rule is not phrased
to prohibit fraud upon any person in connection with "his" purchase or sale. See note 2
supra. Hence the very language used does not restrict, arguably, the availability of the statute
to those who in fact have purchased or sold securities. It is submitted that the Birnbaum
purchaser-seller formulation evolved in part due to the expertise of the "high-powered"
counsel of defendants in Birnbaum.
81. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 US. 128, 151 (1972) ; Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S.
332, 336 (1967).
82. "For instance, a stockholder-plaintiff would need only allege that the fraudulent mis-
management of the corporation ... was aimed at forcing him to sell his shares. A lob-S
action could therefore lie for almost any breach of fiduciary duty .... " Note, lob-5 Standing,
supra note 4, at 1033.
83. See Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 155 (3d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W.
3336 (U.S. Nov. 23, 1973) (No. 73-819); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F2d 461,
464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952) ; Note, l0b-S Standing 1033. But cf. Schoen-
baum v. Firsthrook, 405 F.2d 215, 219-20 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
906 (1969).
84. See International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, [Current Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
5 94,356 at 95,206 (2d Cir., Jan. 15, 1974) (Mulligan, J., concurring & dissenting).
85. Id. at 95,205-06 (Mulligan, J., concurring & dissenting); see note 62 supra. But see
Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 155 (3d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3336 (U.S.
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will not permit any claim which "supplements the common law liability of those
who abuse the trust of their corporate positions."8' 6 Rather, the claim must al-
lege a "fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale or purchase of securi-
ties . . . . " How far other courts will go towards finding the rule "extends to
persons . . . even though their participation in the transaction did not involve
either the purchase or the sale of a security"'8 is a matter of conjecture. It
should be noted that the American Law Institute declined to adopt the Birnbaum
standing requirement in the sale-of-control cases, 9 and also decided that draw-
ing a line between securities fraud and corporate mismanagement, while probably
desirable, was "not ripe for codification." 90 While in all likelihood a party will
not have to be a purchaser or a seller, he will have to show a special nexus to a
purchase or sale. A shareholder or potential shareholder, without more, will not
have a claim for relief under the rule. The new approach probably would not
alter the Birnbaum result on its facts. Thus, a plaintiff will have to purchase
or sell, or stand in some type of contractual or third party beneficiary relation-
ship with one who does purchase or sell, in order to fall within the purview of
the rule.91
Joel E. Davidson
Torts-Negligence-Air Carrier Held to a Duty to Warn Passengers,
Before Departure, Where Turbulent Weather Is Anticipated During the
Flight.-Plaintiff Fleming, a passenger aboard a Delta Air Lines flight from
New Orleans to Chicago alleged injury resulting from Delta's failure to warn
him, before take off, of previously forecasted or anticipated turbulent weather.,
In the course of the aircraft's descent into one of the scheduled stopovers,
the flight encountered "previously forecast turbulence causing Fleming to be
Nov. 23, 1973) (No. 73-819); Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430, 434-35 (10th Cir. 1973);
Williams v. Pennsylvania Co., 367 F. Supp. 1158, 1172-74 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
86. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 956 (1952).
87. Id. at 464.
88. Current CCH Binder at 95,163.
89. ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1423, Comment 5 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973).
90. Id. at Comment 6.
91. Of course, a court wishing to maintain the purchaser-seller rule could argue that the
plaintiffs in Eason fell within the purchaser-seller rule and that the Seventh Circuit was not
justified in concluding that the rule should be rejected. Such a court might reason that plain-
tiffs in Eason were forced sellers (compare note 9 supra) either because their guarantees
were a security or because they were left holding stock in a defunct company which would
be treated as if it had been disposed of at zero value. Alternatively, another court might
conclude that plaintiffs were forced purchasers of the notes which they guaranteed. Several
of these approaches were rejected expressly by the Eason court. See Current CCH Binder at
95,160. The Fifth Circuit simply declined to follow Eason. See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing
Co., [Current Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 94,405 at 95,393 (5th Cir., Feb. 19, 1974).
,l. Fleming v. Delta Air Lines, 359 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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thrown about in his seat, to strike his head against the window trim ... and to
experience severe chest and arm pains later diagnosed as angina pectoris."- The
remainder of the flight was uneventful and plaintiff arrived safely at his ultimate
destination. Thereafter, he suffered a number of recurrences of angina pectoris.
It was his contention that "the fear occasioned by the turbulence caused a last-
ing debilitating heart condition from which he still suffer[ed ."3 Fleming, who
eventually retired as a result of these attacks, attempted to recover for his re-
sulting heart condition and for loss of livelihood.4
The court held that a common carrier is bound to exercise the highest degree
of care5 and concluded that an airline "owes its passengers the duty to share
with them information indicating such serious weather disturbances, so that
they can choose for themselves whether they are physically and emotionally
capable of undertaking the trip and wish to do so." 7 However, on the issue of
whether the flight incident caused plaintiff's entire subsequent history of angina
pectoris, the court found that Fleming had "failed to meet his burden of es-
tablishing his case by a preponderance of the evidence,"8 and limited recovery
"to the pain and suffering occasioned by the in-flight incident and the almost
contemporaneous attack of angina pectoris."O Fleming v. Delta Air Lines, 359
F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
"A common carrier of passengers is one who undertakes for hire to carry all
persons indifferently who may apply for passage, so long as there is room and
there is no legal excuse for refusal."10 A carrier is not an insurer against ac-
2. Id. at 340. Angina pectoris is defined as a "(pjaroxysmal pain of psychosomatic origin,
characterized by a sense of oppression and severe constriction about the chest. ... Asso-
dated is a sense of apprehension of impending death." Blakiston's New Gould Medical
Dictionary 65 (1949).
3. 359 F. Supp. at 340.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 341.
6. The information available to the airline prior to departure included predictions of
'heavy thunderstorms, surface wind gusts of 50 to 70 miles per hour, cloud tops to 45,000
feet, isolated tornadoes and hail storms, and moderate to severe turbulence." Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 342. Supplemental briefs were submitted and the damage issue was resolved on
January 31, 1974. Dr. Fleming was awarded $20,000 for his physical impairment, pain and
suffering and fear of death or permanent disability during and shortly after the flight, and
for "the enduring psychological trauma with fear of death and of renewed attacks." Fleming
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 68-Civ.-1323, at 3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 1974). The court found no
inconsistency between the recovery for long term fear of death and future attacks on the
one hand, and the prior holding that Fleming had failed to establish causation for all his
subsequent attacks. Id. at 2.
10. Mitchell v. New York Life Ins. Co., 75 F.2d 107, 109 (7th Cir. 1934). A common
carrier of passengers is distinguishable from a private carrier "by the franchises conferred
upon it, and the obligations, restrictions, and liabilities with which it is charged .... It must
carry all alike . . .must continuously operate its line, and submit to reasonable regulation."
Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Co. v. Lawson, 143 F. 834, 837 (7th Cir. 1906).
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cidents; rather, it will be held liable only where there has been some failure to
exercise due care."' Nevertheless, the standard of care to which a common
carrier of passengers will be subjected is generally set forth as the highest degree
for the safety of those being transported. 12 This highest degree of care standard
is tempered by and must be consistent with the practical operation of the
plane.13 Thus, section 601(b) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 states that
"the duty resting upon air carriers [is] to perform their services with the highest
possible degree of safety in the public interest .... ,,14
Notwithstanding the aforegoing, the "highest degree of care" standard is but
a majority view and has not escaped criticism.'5 Several courts have held that
the standard is one of reasonable care under the circumstances.", Even tinder
11. See, e.g., Savell v. Southern Ry., 93 F.2d 377, 379 (5th Cir. 1937); Kitsap County
Transp. Co. v. Harvey, 15 F.2d 166, 167 (9th Cir. 1926).
12. See, e.g., Indianapolis & St. L.R.R. v. Horst, 93 U.S. 291, 296 (1876); Francis v.
Fitzpatrick, 89 F.2d 813, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
13. This general expression of the duty has been used to encompass a number of diverse
situations and has been modified or supplemented accordingly. For example, in Arrow
Aviation, Inc. v. Moore, 266 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1959), the court included the phrase "for
the safety of the passengers" in its expression of the duty. Id. at 491. This case involved an
action to recover for injuries sustained in a crash occasioned by the misjudgment of the
pilot in choosing his landing approach. The court contrasted the duty of a common carrier
with that of a private carrier, which it found to be one of ordinary care only. Id. at 493.
Similarly, the court added the phrase "and protection of its passengers from injury" in
Urban v. Frontier Air Lines, 139 F. Supp. 288, 289 (D. Wyo. 1956), finding it negligence
for an airline to allow a passenger to leave her seat in the midst of rough and turbulent
weather. Id. at 290. The court dismissed the defense of assumption of the risk as being In-
consistent with this high degree of care. Id. at 289. With respect to assumption of the risk,
Professor Prosser stated that there are situations where "[tihe defendant may be under a
legal duty, which he is not free to refuse to perform .. . . [Here] the plaintiff does not as-
sume the risk when he proceeds to make use of the defendant's services or facilities, not-
withstanding his knowledge of the danger." W. Prosser, Torts § 68, at 452 (4th ed. 1971).
Southeastern Aviation, Inc. v. Hurd, 209 Tenn. 639, 661, 355 S.W.2d 436, 446, appeal dis-
missed, 371 U.S. 21 (1962), explained that this duty exists not only with respect to the opera-
tion of the plane, but also with respect to its equipment and maintenance.
14. 49 U.S.C. § 1421(b) (1970) (part of Subchapter VI which is entitled The Safety
Regulation of Civil Aeronautics).
15. The New York Court of Appeals expressed doubt as to the validity of a distinction
between degrees of care in McLean v. Triboro Coach Corp., 302 N.Y. 49, 96 N.E.2d 83
(1950), questioning "whether it is ever practicable for one to use more care than one reason-
ably can; whether it is ever reasonable for one to use less; or whether, in sum, there can
ever be more than one degree of care." Id. at 51, 96 N.E.2d at 83-84. Although this case
dealt with a bus line, the court's comments were directed toward the duty to which common
carriers in general should be held. The law in New York remains uncertain, however, since
the court did not find it necessary to specify the degree of care under the facts of this case.
16. The court faced the issue of standard of care squarely in Krasnow v. National Air-
lines, Inc., 228 F.2d 326, 328 (2d. Cir. 1955). Attempting to apply New York law, the court
seized upon the dictum in McLean v. Triboro Coach Corp., 302 N.Y. 49, 96 N.E.2d 83
(1950), note 15 supra, as being indicative of a trend toward the application of a standard
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the latter standard, however, it must be remembered that one such circumstance
is that an air carrier is being charged with negligence.
The distinction between degrees of care, thus, may be one of semantics only.17
In practice, the burden imposed upon the air carrier (or common carrier in
general) is a substantial one. The passenger, who has no control over the oper-
ation of the plane, entrusts his safety to the airline during the course of the
flight; he has no option to abandon the flight in mid-passage. Airlines hold
themselves out as a safe mode of transportation and any departure from rigid
safety precautions could be disastrous. It is on this basis that the courts, while
refusing to hold an airline to an insurer's liability,'8 are willing to speak in terms
of a higher standard of care.
Inclement weather and turbulent air conditions can affect all phases of air-
line and airport operations. It is in this context that Fleming must be evaluated.
The determinant factors were the prevailing turbulence and Delta's knowledge
that such conditions were to be expected. The court found that while the con-
ditions were perhaps "not extreme enough to prevent take-off, [they were] suffi-
ciently serious to be a matter of significant concern to prospective travellers."' 0
The cases dealing with turbulence have focused primarily on the duty of the
airline to provide for the in-ffight safety of the plane and passengers.
When adverse weather is encountered in flight, the warning of passengers to
fasten seatbelts would seem to be the minimum obligation of the carrier. In
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Silber 20 the critical determination by the jury at trial
had been whether the pilot knew or had reason to know or suspect the turbulent
weather. 21 The circuit court recognized the difficulty in predicting air turbulence
and held the airlines were not under an absolute duty "to determine the likely
of reasonable care under the circumstances (including defendant's status as a common car-
rier) and held a charge to that effect not to be erroneous. Although the standard of care
was not actually in issue in Gerard v. American Airlines, Inc., 272 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1959),
the court saw the standard of reasonable care under the circumstances as the "logical view"
and held the jury's inquiry to be "whether reasonable care was exercised" in view of the
fact that defendant was a common carrier. Id. at 36.
17. Prosser stated that when instructing a jury to apply a high degree of care "[there
is seldom reason to think that [the courts] mean to say anything more than that greater
or less care will be required under the circumstances." W. Prosser, Torts § 34, at 181 (4th ed.
1971). In his opinion, such an instruction is "incorrect," but unlikely to be prejudicial. Id
18. See, e.g., Wilson v. Capital Airlines, 240 F.2d 492, 494 (4th Cir. 1957). See also note
11 supra and accompanying text.
19. 359 F. Supp. at 341.
20. 324 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1963).
21. Id. at 40. See Small v. Transcontinental & W. Air, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 2d 408, 216 P.2d
36 (2d DisL 1950) (also involving a seatbelt warning). Upholding the jury verdict, the
court stated: "If it is possible to determine or even suspect that under certain conditions
downdrafts are likely or possible, it would appear to be the duty of a prudent operator to
take whatever precautions are necessary or available to guard against dangerous conse-
quences." Id. at 410-11, 216 P.2d at 37. Cf. Ness v. West Coast Airlines, Inc., 90 Idaho 111,
410 P.2d 965 (1965). In the latter case the plaintiff was thrown about in his seat by turbu-
lence. He had loosened his seatbelt because the sign had been turned off. On appeal from a
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presence of the air turbulence. . . ."2 Nevertheless, it upheld the jury's finding
that the pilot had been negligent in failing to give the warning when it could be
anticipated that the flight would encounter turbulent weather.23
Beyond the minimum duty to provide for the security of the passengers when
turbulence is to be expected, it would seem that the airline also has a duty to
circumnavigate anticipated turbulent weather conditions or to take other pre-
cautions to insure the safety of the flight. The court found such a duty to exist
in Cudney v. Braniff Airways, Inc.,2 4 holding:
[W]here science does afford or comes to afford a forewarning of a weather condition
attended by the probability or reasonable likelihood of a hazard of dangerous turbu-
lence, it would be too much to say that the airline need not anticipate and take the
commensurate precautions reasonably available to guard against the hazard; and where
the means or precautions... of avoiding the hazard of dangerous turbulence are known
or are pointed out in the evidence to have been available . . . the failure to take
such specific commensurate precaution or precautions, in our opinion, constitutes
negligence.2 5
A further provision for the in-flight safety of the plane and passengers is the
obligation of the airline to transmit weather information to the pilot of a flight
which can be expected to encounter adverse weather conditions. In Stiles v. Na-
tional Airlines, Inc.,26 it was found that weather information available to Na-
tional was not transmitted to the pilot. The flight proceeded into a severe storm
and crashed into the Gulf of Mexico. The court listed twelve findings of negli-
gence on the part of National, the majority of which were based on its failure
to transmit such available weather information.27
directed verdict for the defendant the court held that res ipsa loquitur was not applicable,
but that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence that the turbulence should have been
anticipated to defeat the directed verdict for the defendant and allow the case to proceed on
a theory of negligence. Id. at 117-18, 410 P.2d at 968-69.
22. 324 F.2d at 40.
23. Id. at 39. The appeal had been brought to determine whether there had been error
in the instruction to the jury relating to the duty of the airline. The court concluded that
the instruction had not been prejudicial. Along similar lines, Urban v. Frontier Air Lines,
139 F. Supp. 288 (D. Wyo. 1956), found the airline liable for injury resulting to a passenger
when she was allowed to leave her seat at a time when turbulence was foreseeable. Id. at 290.
24. 300 S.W.2d 412 (Mo. 1957).
25. Id. at 417, (the pilot had not attempted to avoid the storm nor had he reduced
speed when it was encountered). Cf. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 224
F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 937 (1956), finding that Northwest's flying of
the plane into a storm was properly submitted to the jury on the issue of contributory
negligence.
26. 161 F. Supp. 125 (E.D. La. 1958), aff'd, 268 F.2d 400 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
885 (1959).
27. Id. at 130-31. Apparently the court did not find it necessary to establish that such a
duty existed. The opinion merely stated the facts and enumerated findings of negligence on
the part of the airline. National had failed to provide the flight with current weather fore-
casts; what little information it did provide arrived too late for the flight to take effective
evasive action. Id.
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Stiles is important in another respect because it goes beyond the requirement
of providing for the in-flight safety of the plane and passengers to include a duty
to warn a flight, before departure, of turbulent conditions known to exist within
the course of its projected route. Prior to the departure of National's flight from
Tampa, the airline had at its disposal information about two previous flights
through the same general area. One such flight had experienced extremely severe
turbulence while the other had been forced to turn back because of the adverse
weather conditions. Information about a cancelled third flight became available
while the flight at issue was only three minutes out of Tampa. The information,
however, was not dispatched. Permitting the flight to depart without the benefit
of such information and to proceed unwarned until it was too late to turn backes
was held to constitute negligence.2 9
In a more recent case, Stork v. United States,30 air traffic controllers were
held to a duty to warn a flight that weather conditions were below the minimum
standards for take-off.3 1 The pilot had received an unqualified clearance for take-
off in conditions with "zero miles in fog" visibility. The United States (which
is liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for the actions of control tower
operators because they are agents of the Federal Aviation Administrations - )
claimed that the clearance related to traffic conditions only and that there was
no duty to warn a pilot of weather conditions of which he is or should be aware.
The court held, however, that a warning would have eliminated any doubt as to
the conditions, and that under such extreme conditions a warning was required
regardless of the pilot's awareness 3 3 The court felt that allowing the pilot to
rely on an unqualified clearance "constituted a breach of duty on the part of
air traffic control personnel.1 34
Fleming has now imposed an additional- duty-"the duty to share with [pas-
sengers] information indicating . .. serious weather disturbances, so that they
can choose for themselves whether they are physically and emotionally capable
of undertaking the trip and wish to do so." 35 In Fleming there was no finding by
28. Some of the information was transmitted to the pilot, but only after the flight had
encountered the storm and the pilot had requested information. Id. at 131.
29. Id.
30. 430 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1970).
31. Id. at 1108.
32. See Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 73-78 (D.C. Cir.), afId sub
nom. United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 US. 907 (1955) (per curiam).
33. 430 F.2d at 1108.
34. Id. (presumably, while the duty is owed directly to the pilot it exists indirectly for
the benefit of the passengers who stand to be injured if the pilot is uninformed). Cf. Ing-
ham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 US. 931 (1967),
finding a similar breach of duty where the control tower operators failed to transmit
changes in weather which an airline crew would consider important in determining whether
to land. Id. at 235. The decision to hold the controllers to this duty was based, to some
extent, on the reliance which both passengers and airlines place upon the government for
insuring the safety of their flights. Id. at 235-36.
35. 359 F. Supp. at 341.
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the court that the airline was negligent during the course of the flight. There
was no question that the plaintiff had been warned properly to fasten his seat-
belt when the turbulence was encountered; indeed, he was wearing it at the
time he was injured.36 In addition, there appears to be no dispute that weather
information had been made available to the operators of the flight. The expert
testimony and meteorological reports which were introduced in evidence estab-
lished that information was available "which should reasonably have led [the
pilot] to foresee the possibility of encountering the type of turbulence which in
fact occurred." 37 The plaintiff in Fleming asked that the court impose a duty
upon Delta "to warn its passengers of the possibility of turbulence of which
it had advance notice giving them the option to postpone or cancel their
trip .... "38 Such a duty clearly goes beyond in-flight safety into the realm
of pre-flight precautions. The Fleming holding may find some support in Stork
v. United States,39 where the court stressed the reliance which failure to warn
might foster.40 Implicit in the Fleming opinion is the notion that passengers
should not have to rely on the judgment of the airline or pilot with respect to
the potential effect of weather conditions upon themselves. Rather, the deci-
sion whether to undertake the flight is one "which rightly belongs to each
passenger." 41
In another respect the situation in Fleming is analogous to that of Stiles v.
National Airlines, Inc.,42 where the little weather information which was trans-
mitted to the pilot arrived too late for the flight to take evasive action. 43 Flem-
ing's realization that his flight would encounter turbulent weather was also too
late for evasive action; once the flight had departed he had no alternative but
to ride out the storm.
Whenever information is available to the airlines it would seem to be in the
best interest of the passengers to bring it to their attention. However, it would
be detrimental to safety to require that the passengers be informed of every
detail pertaining to the flight and its operation. It is the airline management and
the pilot alone who are qualified to make decisions with respect to the flight it-
36. Although this fact is not found in the opinion of the court, it is substantiated in
the plaintiff's and the defendant's trial memoranda. Brief for Plaintiff at 4, Brief for De-
fendant at 2, Fleming v. Delta Airlines, 359 F. Supp. 339 (1973).
37. 359 F. Supp. at 340-41. See also note 6 supra.
38. 359 F. Supp. at 340.
39. 430 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1970); see notes 30-34 supra and accompanying text.
40. 430 F.2d at 1108.
41. 359 F. Supp. at 341.
42. 161 F. Supp. 125 (E.D. La. 1958), aff'd, 268 F.2d 400 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
885 (1959); see notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text. Stiles is similar because it en-
tailed a duty to warn a flight before departure of turbulent conditions known to exist in
the course of its expected route. 161 F. Supp. at 131. This duty, however, was owed to the
operators of the plane, and only indirectly affected the passengers who were not held to be
entitled to the weather information. In Fleming, on the other hand, this was held to be the
passengers' right.
43. 161 F. Supp. at 129, 131.
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self. Involving the passengers in such decisions would serve no useful purpose.
As far as the passengers are concerned, the scope of their decision is limited to
whether or not-in light of their individual circumstances-they should board
the flight, and it is at this pre-flight stage of the journey that they are entitled
to such information as might influence their decision.4 4 Once the flight has de-
parted, safety requires that the pilot be in absolute control. At this point the
passengers have entrusted their care to the carrier and, while the pilot may keep
them informed of the conditions in the air or warn them to fasten their seat
belts, any decision pertaining to the operation of the particular flight is outside
their province.
From the perspective of the airlines the burden which the Fleming decision
imposes could hardly be considered convenient or economical. While the court
did not set any guidelines for the implementation of its decision in the future,
it recognized that "conditions may be dangerous to some and not to others," and
that "an airline cannot be expected to screen the former from the latter." 45
Perhaps the logical method of making forecasted in-flight weather information
available to the passengers is to post such information prominently at the board-
ing gate. Assuming that all passengers pass through the gate, they would then
be on notice of the possibility of encountering such posted weather conditions.
This, in itself, would seem to be a very slight burden when balanced against the
safety benefits to be gained. Problems might arise, however, when updated in-
formation becomes available after some passengers have boarded. Would the
airline have to make periodic reports to the passengers up until the minute of
departure? Assuming they did-and such would seem consistent with the ration-
ale underlying the requirement for the original posting"u-how would the air-
line provide substitute passengers for those who decided to cancel or postpone
prior to take-off? These problems would be multiplied when there is a flight with
many scheduled stopovers. Conceivably, the airline would be held to the duty
to warn its passengers of the weather conditions on each "leg" of the flight so
that the individual could decide for himself whether to proceed from each of
these points.
The true importance of Fleming may be as an indicator of things to come.
That is, it may evidence the growing concern in the area of consumer protec-
tion.4 It underscores the right of the consumer to know exactly what he may
anticipate before he entrusts his person to the airlines. The movement toward
44. It would appear that there is a ready analogy here with the "informed consent" doc-
trine in medical malpractice suits. However, in those cases there exists some discretion on
the part of the surgeon to withhold some information where full disclosure might adversely
affect the outcome of the operation. It does not seem that under the facts of Fleming the
airline has such discretion. Although the duty to warn exists only when turbulence may be
expected, it would seem that the airline is not free to determine what degree of turbulence
would necessitate such a warning.
45. 359 F. Supp. at 341, citing D'Aleman v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 259 F.2d
493, 494 (2d Cir. 1958).
46. See text accompanying notes 41, 44 supra.
47. See, e.g., Hart, Trends in Product Safety Protection, 25 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 460
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consumerism, however, may present considerable problems to the commercial
aviation industry as it exists today.48 The result may be more than a mere shift
in operational procedures to comply with court decisions. Rather, it may initiate
a readjustment of the entire attitude of doing business as a common carrier
of passengers.
Gilbert L. Klemann, 11
Uniform Commercial Code-Letters of Credit-Bank Liable for Confirm-
ing Non-Bank Letter of Credit.-Allied Mortgage Consultants, Inc., a mort-
gage broker, issued' to plaintiff, Barclays Bank, its irrevocable letter of credit
in a sum not to exceed $400,000 for the purpose of reimbursing the plaintiff for
advances made to Bay Holding Company. Upon Allied's request, defendant Mer-
cantile National Bank, issued a letter4 which obligated it to "undertake to
(1970); Volpe, The Department of Transportation and the Consumer, 8 San Diego L. Rev.
4 (1971).
48. On October 18, 1973 federal district court Judge Charles R. Richey awarded con-
sumer advocate Ralph Nader $50,000 in punitive damages for being "bumped" from an
overbooked Allegheny Airlines flight for which he had a reservation. Nader v. Allegheny
Airlines, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 128 (D.D.C. 1973). "Mr. Nader ... hailed the order as a 'major
breakthrough' in behalf of consumers in their dealings with common carriers." N.Y. Times,
Oct. 19, 1973, at 12, col. 3.
1. Uniform Commercial Code § 5-103(1) (c) [hereinafter cited by section as UCC] pro-
vides: "An 'issuer' is a bank or other person issuing a credit."
2. See note 12 infra.
3. See notes 5-7 infra and accompanying text. A comprehensive treatment of the rules
governing letters of credit may be found in W. Ward & H. Harfield, Bank Credits and Ac-
ceptances (4th ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as Ward & Harfield]. Some of the better treat-
ments of letter-of-credit transactions are found in Chadsey, Practical Effect of the Uniform
Commercial Code on Documentary Letter of Credit Transactions, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 618
(1954); Funk, U.C.C. Article 5 and the Uniform Customs and Practice, 11 How. L.J. 88
(1965); Harfield, Code Treatment of Letters of Credit, 48 Cornell L.Q. 92 (1962) [herein-
after cited as Code Treatment]; Shattuck & Guernsey, Letters of Credit-A Comparison of
Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Washington Practice, 37 Wash. L. Rev.
325 (1962); Comment, Commercial Letters of Credit: Development and Expanded Use in
Modem Commercial Transactions, 4 Cumberland-Samford L. Rev. 134 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Expanded Use]; Comment, Recent Extensions in the Use of Commercial Letters of
Credit, 66 Yale L.J. 902 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Recent Extensions]. Probably the most
comprehensive section-by-section analysis of Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code Is
found in 3 N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Study of the Uniform Commercial Code: Article 5-
Documentary Letters of Credit, Legislative Document No. 65(F) (1955) [hereinafter cited
as N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Study of Uniform Commercial Code].
4. The letter read as follows:
Mercantile National Bank
70 Broad Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
June 1, 1970
Barclays Bank Limited D.C.O.
200 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10017
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honor any drafts presented" to it "on or before [the) expiration date of the let-
ter of credit in accordance with the terms and conditions of said letter of credit.":;
Based upon the security of these two letters, plaintiff loaned 350,000 to Bay.
Upon maturity of the loan and subsequent dishonor by Bay, plaintiff presented
drafts upon Allied pursuant to its letter of credit. Allied in turn dishonored the
drafts, whereupon plaintiff demanded the drafts be honored by Mfercantile in its
capacity as a confirming bank.6 Upon defendant's denial of liability, plaintiff
sued to recover, alleging defendant's letter to be both a confirmation by de-
fendant of an irrevocable letter of credit and an independent undertaking to
honor the drafts. After determining that defendant was a confirming bank and
thus liable for the credit extended in reliance on its letter, the district court
granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.7 The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed,8 holding that while the Uniform Commercial Code only ex-
plicitly provides for the confirmation of a letter of credit issued by a bank, the
possibility of confirmation of a non-bank letter of credit was not thereby pre-
cluded. Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile National Bank, 481 F.2d 1224
(5th Cir. 1973), petition for cert. dismissed pursuant to Rule 60, 94 S. Ct.
888 (1974).
The modem commercial letter of credit has been defined in various terms.0
The Uniform Commercial Code gives one definition:
Gentlemen:
We are enclosing an irrevocable letter of credit issued by Allied Mortgage Consultants, 127
Peachtree Street, N.E., Atlanta, Georgia dated June 1, 1970, in the amount of $400,000.00 in
your favor for the account of Bay Holding Company Limited.
We can unconditionally confirm this is a valid letter of credit and that they have at all times
sufficient funds to honor this commitment.
We hereby confirm the letter of credit and undertake to honor any drafts presented to us on
or before expiration date of the letter of credit in accordance with the terms and conditions
of said letter of credit.
Very truly yours
/s/ Carl AT. Harris
Esecutive Vice President
CMH/ac
Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F2d 1224, 1227 n.3 (5th Cir. 1973),
petition for cert. dismissed pursuant to Rule 60, 94 Sup. Ct. 888 (1974).
S. Id.
6. ,UCC § 5-103(1) (f) provides: "A 'confirming bank' is a bank which engages either that
it will itself honor a credit already issued by another bank or that such a credit iUll be hon-
ored by the issuer or a third bank." See also UCC § 2-325(3) & Comment 3.
7. Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 339 F. Supp. 457 (NJD. Ga. 1972).
8. Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1973), petition
for cert. dismissed pursuant to Rule 60, 94 Sup. CL 888 (1974).
9. Wiley, How to Use Letters of Credit in Financing the Sale of Goods, 20 Bus. Law. 495,
496 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Wiley]: "The letter of credit in its most common form is ...
nothing more than a written promise by a bank, on behalf of its buyer-customer, to make
payment to a seller of goods on the terms and conditions stated in the letter of credit itself."
Code Treatment 92-93: "The letter of credit is an assurance of payment upon the performance
of certain conditions; it provides a means by which a person, whose own promise to make a
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(1) In this Article unless the context otherwise requires
(a) "Credit" or "letter of credit" means an engagement by a bank or other persons
made at the request of a customer and of a kind within the scope of this Article...
that the issuer will honor drafts or other demands for payment upon compliance with
the conditions specified in the credit. A credit may be either revocable or irrevocable.
The engagement may be either an agreement to honor or a statement that the bank or
other person is authorized to honor.' 0
A noted author adopts more general terms:
A letter of credit is an engagement by a bank or finance company or other issuer which
is made at the request of its customer or some other person who owes a debt which
will arise in the future to a third person, which is made to that third person. The en-
gagement is that if certain things are done, either by way of presentation of pieces of
paper or simply by the making of a demand for payment of a draft or acceptance, pay-
ment or acceptance will take place. 1
Despite the variation in terminology, these definitions express the general char-
acteristics of the letter of credit: an irrevocable promise to pay,'12 independent
from the underlying transaction,' 8 upon strict compliance with the stipulated
terms of the credit.14 Flexibility,' 5 coupled with the security inherent in the strict
payment might be of dubious value, is able to obtain the benefit of a richer reputation, a
stronger credit, which will be sufficient to produce desired action."
10. UCC § 5-103(I)(a).
11. Mentschicoff, How to Handle Letters of Credit, 19 Bus. Law. 107, 107-03 (1963).
12. Revocable credits may be issued but are rarely used since such a credit could be
modified or revoked by either the issuer or the customer without requesting the consent of
or notifying the other parties involved. United States Steel Prods. Co. v. Irving Bank-
Columbia Trust Co., 9 F.2d 230, 231-32 (2d Cir. 1925); UCC § 5-106(3). The reason for
its infrequent use is obvious: it tends to defeat the very purpose of introducing the credit
of the bank. Wiley 505. The irrevocable credit, however, provides a beneficiary with a
definite promise that his drafts or demands for payment will be honored, if there is com-
pliance with the credit's terms, since the irrevocable credit can be modified or revoked solely
with his consent. Asociacion de Azucareros de Guatemala v. United States Nat'l Bank, 423
F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 1970); Bril v. Suomen Pankki Finlands Bank, 199 Misc. 11, 19,
97 N.Y.S.2d 22, 29 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (quoting UCC § 4-105(3)); UCC § 5-106(2).
13. The function of an issuer of a letter of credit is solely to finance the sale, If the
beneficiary complies with the terms of the credit, and not to participate in the sale in any
other manner. Sisalcords do Brazil, Ltd. v. Fiacao Brasileira de Sisal, S.A., 450 F.2d 419, 422
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972); Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 465 (2d Cir. 1970); Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank, 239
N.Y. 386, 395-96, 146 N.E. 636, 639 (1925); UCC § 5-109(1) (a). See Fidelity Bank v.
Lutheran Mut. Life Ins. Co., 465 F.2d 211, 214 (10th Cir. 1972): "Where the letter of
credit is complete in itself no reason exists to consider the underlying contract." If the issuer
were required to insure that the underlying transaction was fulfilled this burden would
encumber the flexibility and effectiveness of the letter of credit. See also Harfield, The In-
creasing Domestic Use of the Letter of Credit, 4 U.C.C.LJ. 251, 257 (1972). Thus, it is this
isolation from the underlying agreement which enables letters of credit to be inexpensive.
Auerbach, Letters of Credit-A Concise Codification, 23 Ohio St. L.J. 246, 252 (1962).
14. Banco Espanol de Credito v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 385 F.2d 230, 234 (1st
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1013 (1968) ; Fair Pavilions, Inc. v. First Nat'l City Bank,
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compliance requirement, enables usage of the letter of credit in commercial
transactions of many types.16
Historically, letters of credit developed from a need for a satisfactory device
of providing adequate security for both buyers and sellers in international sales
transactions. 17 In the usual situation, the seller is reluctant to extend credit to
a buyer without some security, as in cases in which the parties are from different
countries 8 or the seller is not familiar with the buyer's credit.10 Thus, the buyer
requests his bank to issue him a letter of credit naming the seller as bene-
ficiary,20 thereby obligating the bank or issuer to the seller for the amount of
credit extended. 21
19 N.Y.2d 512, 516, 227 N.E.2d 839, 841, 281 N.Y.S.2d 23, 25 (1967); Ufitec, S.A. v. Trade
Bank & Trust Co., 21 App. Div. 2d 187, 188, 249 N.Y.S.2d 5S7, 558-59 (Ist Dep't 1964),
aff'd without opinion, 16 N.Y.2d 698, 209 N.E2d 551, 261 N.Y.S2d 893 (1965). For an
example where the letter of credit specified a bill of lading covering "dried grapes" while the
bill of lading actually presented described the goods as "raisins" see Bank of Italy v. Mer-
chants Nat'l Bank, 236 N.Y. 106, 108, 140 N.E. 211 (1923), cert. denied, 264 U.S. 581 (1924).
See also Old Colony Trust Co. v. Lawyers' Title & Trust Co., 297 F. 152, 155-56 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 265 U.S. 585 (1924) (excellent discussion of the reasons for strict compliance).
15. The authorities uniformly agree, for example, that a letter of credit need not be in
any particular form. Drinc-O-Matic Inc. v. Frank, 141 F.2d 177, 179 (2d Cir. 1944) (by
implication) ; Pines v. United States, 123 F.2d 825, 828 (8th Cir. 1941) ; Border Nat'l Bank
v. American Nat'l Bank, 282 F. 73, 79 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 260 US. 701 (1922). See
UCC § 5-104(1).
16. See Fidelity Bank v. Lutheran Mut. Life Ins. Co., 465 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1972)
(letter of credit used to assure compliance by borrower with condition of loan commitment);
Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publishing Co. v. Pacific Nat'l Bank, 343 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. CaL
1971) (use of letter of credit to insure performance of construction contract); Victory
Carriers, Inc. v. United States, 467 F.2d 1334 (Ct. CL 1972) (letter of credit used in lieu of
performance bond); Fair Pavilions, Inc. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 19 N.Y.2d 512, 227 N.E.2d
839, 281 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1967) ; Gewolb, The Law Applicable to International Letters of Credit,
11 Vill. L. Rev. 742 (1966); Miller, Problems and Patterns of the Letter of Credit, 1959 U.
IlL L.F. 162, 189-99.
17. Ninety percent of international sales transactions involve letters of credit. W. Hawk-
land, A Transactional Guide to the Uniform Commercial Code 791 (1964). Use of the mech-
anism on the domestic scene is definitely on the increase. See Harfield, The Increasing
Domestic Use of the Letter of Credit, 4 U.C.C.L.J. 251 (1972) ; Expanded Use, supra note 3,
at 151-54; 22 S. Carolina L. Rev. 381 (1970).
18. See, e.g., Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 216 App. Div.
495, 215 N.Y.S. 525 (1st Dep't 1926), afPd, 245 N.Y. 377, 157 N.E. 272 (1927); Brl v.
Suomen Pankki Finlands Bank, 199 Misc. 11, 97 N.Y.S.2d 22 (Sup. CL), appeal dismissed,
101 N.Y.S.2d 256 (1st Dep't 1950).
19. See, e.g., Dulien Steel Prods., Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 298 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1962)
(by implication).
20. "A 'beneficiary' of a credit is a person who is entitled under its terms to draw or
demand payment." UCC § 5-103(1) (d). The party who requests his bank to issue a letter
of credit, or confirm one, for the benefit of another is referred to as the "customer." UCC §
5-103 (1) (g).
21. UCC § 5-103(1) (a).
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Procedurally, the issuing bank generally will contact a bank in the bene-
ficiary's area, referred to as the advising bank,2 2 in order to notify the beneficiary
of the credit. If the advising bank agrees to honor the drafts drawn on the credit,
it is called the confirming bank.23 Consequently, the beneficiary obtains im-
mediate payment for the transported goods upon presentment of the drafts
and specified documents, if dealing with a documentary draft,24 to the local
confirming bank.2 5 The promise of a confirming bank that it will honor the
beneficiary's drafts, or that the issuing bank or a third bank will honor them
constitutes a definite undertaking by the confirming bank 20 Therefore, it be-
comes obligated to pay upon presentation of conforming documents, irrespective
of the beneficiary's compliance with the other terms of the underlying trans-
action. 27
Significantly, "a beneficiary who has received a confirmed credit has the in-
dependent engagements of both the issuer and the confirming bank. 28 There-
fore, the seller may turn to his local bank for payment and, in case of its refusal,
to the issuing bank 2 9 Naturally, the confirming bank is entitled to reimburse-
ment from the issuing bank, 0 which in turn collects from the customer-buyer. 81
With a confirmed letter of credit and the resulting liability of the two banks,
22. UCC § 5-103(1) (e) provides: "An 'advising bank' is a bank which gives notification
of the issuance of a credit by another bank." The advising bank is liable only for the accuracy
of its advice. See UCC § 5-107(1).
23. See note 6 supra. For an excellent discussion of the meaning of the word "confirm"
see the opinion of Justice Halpern in Bril v. Suomen Pankki Finlands Bank, 199 Misc. 11,
26-27, 97 N.Y.S.2d 22, 35-36 (Sup. Ct.), appeal dismissed, 101 N.Y.S.2d 256 (1st Dep't 1950).
See also Thayer, Irrevocable Credits in International Commerce: Their Legal Nature, 36
Colum. L. Rev. 1031, 1034-37 (1936).
24. See UCC § 5-103(1) (b). See also UCC § 4-104(1) (f).
25. "This result has two advantages. The seller has obtained payment for the goods while
they are still in transit; thus he avoids the risk of being in an unfavorable bargaining position
should an unscrupulous buyer choose to reject otherwise satisfactory goods In the hope of
being able to settle for a cheaper price. And the seller is better able to use the buyer's pay-
ment to finance his own suppliers." Recent Extensions, supra note 3, at 903 n.5 (citation
omitted).
26. "A 'confirming' bank adds its own liability to that of the issuing bank and itself
undertakes to honor drafts." G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty § 3-17 at 111
n.96 (1957).
27. Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank, 239 N.Y. 386, 395, 146 N.E. 636, 639
(1925); Laudisi v. American Exch. Nat'l Bank, 239 N.Y. 234, 242-43, 146 N.E. 347, 350
(1924). See note 13 supra.
28. UCC § 5-107, Comment 2.
29. See Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 216 App. Div. 495,
498, 215 N.Y.S. 525, 528-29 (1st Dep't 1926), aff'd, 245 N.Y. 377, 157 N.E. 272 (1927).
30. UCC § 5-107(2) & Comment 2.
31. E.g., French Am. Banking Corp. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 126 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd mem., 282 App. Div. 1024, 126 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1st Dep't 1953), aft'd, 307 N.Y. 616, 120
N.E.2d 826 (1954). A
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the seller is able to attain security and convenience,32 thereby evidencing once
again the letter of credit's high degree of commercial utility.33
Although it has been estimated that ninety percent of all international trans-
actions are financed through the use of letters of credit,34 there is "surprisingly
little decisional law" in this field.35 This is particularly true in regard to con-
firming banks. Nevertheless, the cases which have dealt with the use of these
"financial instruments"38 adequately illustrate the principles herein discussed.
Liberty National Bank & Trust Co. v. Bank of America National Trust &
Savings Association3 7 exemplifies the definite obligation undertaken by a con-
firming bank. In Liberty, an Oklahoma bank issued a documentary letter of
credit to a California bank, and thereafter sent a telegram stating "authorize
payment Geneva on receipt of cable advice" from a Swiss bank, which was to
describe certain documents within its possession. Upon receipt of the acknowl-
edging telegram from Switzerland, the California bank accordingly credited the
Swiss bank's account. The court found such credits on the books to constitute
payment according to bank customs,38 removing from the California bank the
alleged obligation to reverse, by bookkeeping entries, these payments so madeY0
By force of this conclusion, the Oklahoma bank became impliedly obligated to
reimburse the California bank for the amounts paid.4 °
It was stated in Ando International, Ltd. v. Woolmaster Corp.41 that a definite
obligation by a confirming bank-like that undertaken in Liberty-is indepen-
dent from the underlying transaction. Plaintiff in Ando entered into a written
contract for the purchase of wool from defendant and arranged for payment by
32. Crawford, Practical Use of Documentary Credit Paper, 30 TuL L. Rev. 235, 238
(1956).
33. See note 16 supra.
34. See note 17 supra.
35. Code Treatment, supra note 3, at 93.
36. Id.
37. 218 F.2d 831 (loth Cir. 1955).
38. Id. at 838. See Dixon, Irmaos & Cia. Ltda. v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 144 F.2d 759 (2d
Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 850 (1945), in which it was held that an issuer was bound
to accept an indemnity offered by the presenting bank which promised to protect the issuer
from any liability resulting from the presenting bank's failure to prefer a full set of bills of
lading as required by the credit. The court's ruling was based upon the existence of a custom
among New York banks of accepting such indemnities. The court reasoned that since the
custom was known and was not specifically negatived in the contract, it was incorporated into
their agreement. Id. at 762. The decision has been severely criticized by spokesmen repre-
senting the banking point of view. See Backus & Harfield, Custom and Letters of Credit: The
Dixon, Irmaos Case, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 589 (1952). It has also been praised. See Hoanold,
Letters of Credit, Custom, Missing Documents and the Dixon Case: A Reply to Backus and
Harfield, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 504 (1953).
39. 218 F.2d at 838.
40. Id. at 836. See Nacional Financiera, S. v. Banco de Ponce, 120 N.Y.S.2d 373, 416
(Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd, 283 App. Div. 939, 131 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1st Dep't 1954).
41. 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1071 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
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having its factor issue a letter of credit against the drafts presented by the de-
fendant. The factor accepted the drafts and returned them to the defendant,
who sold them to two banks. Upon the discovery that the goods were defective,
plaintiff sought to enjoin2 the defendant, the factor, and the banks from de-
livering, presenting and paying the drafts. The court found the banks' "sole
concern" to be whether the documents involved were in order.48 Thus, according
to both case law4 4 and the Code,45 the issuer must honor a demand for payment
whether or not the goods conform to the terms of the transaction.
An exception to this general rule occurs where alternative interpretations can
be given to a letter of credit. This was illustrated in Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase
Manhattan Bank.4 6 There, the letter of credit stated that the sum was payable
against presentation of documents covering ocean freight for shipment of 9,690
metric tons of scrap, and that partial shipments were not permitted. After the
defendant confirmed the credit, the plaintiff's ship sailed with its full capacity
of about 10,000 metric tons. On the same day, however, the letter of credit was
amended to provide for shipment of 19,300 metric tons. Upon presentment of
the documents, defendant refused to honor on the ground that the plaintiff had
made a partial shipment in violation of the terms of the credit. The district court
granted summary judgment for the defendant, 47 asserting the independence of
the letter of credit from the underlying contract.48 The court of appeals reversed:
Where a letter of credit is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which makes
it fair, customary and one which prudent men would naturally enter into, while the
other makes it inequitable, the former interpretation must be preferred to the latter,
and a construction rendering the contract possible of performance will be preferred
to one which renders its performance impossible or meaningless.4 9
42. The courts have given injunctive relief pursuant to UCC § 5-114 only under limited
circumstances. In Ando Intl, Ltd. v. Woolmaster Corp., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1071,
1074, since the plaintiff did not assert that the shipping documents were non-conforming and
did not establish that the documents were fraudulent in any way, injunctive relief pursuant
to Article 5 was denied.
43. Id. at 1073-74.
44. Dulien Steel Prods., Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 298 F.2d 836, 841 (2d Cir. 1962);
Continental Nat'l Bank v. National City Bank, 69 F.2d 312, 315 (9th Cir. 1934), cert. denied,
293 U.S. 557 (1935). See note 13 supra.
45. The UCC codified case law in § 5-114(1), which provides: "An issuer must honor a
draft or demand for payment which complies with the terms of the relevant credit regardless
of whether the goods or documents conform to the underlying contract for sale or other
contract between the customer and the beneficiary. The issuer is not excused from honor of
such a draft or demand by reason of an additional general term that all documents must be
satisfactory to the issuer, but an issuer may require that specified documents must be satis-
factory to it."
46. 425 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1970).
47. Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 294 F. Supp. 246, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
48 Id. at 248. See also note 13 supra.
49. 425 F.2d at 466. The general principles which apply to other written contracts are
applicable also to letters of credit. Fair Pavilions, Inc. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 24 App.
Div. 2d 109, 112, 264 N.Y.S.2d 255, 258 (1st Dep't 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 19 N.Y.2d
512, 227 N.E.2d 839, 281 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1967).
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Since the ship could not transport the 19,300 tons in one voyage, an opposite
ruling would have rendered the letter of credit meaninglessP0 Thus, the court
further elaborated on its guideline for the resolution of ambiguities:
Moreover, as between the beneficiary of a letter of credit and the issuer (or in this
case, Chase, since confirmers are to be treated as issuers under New York commercial
law) if ambiguity exists, the words are taken as strongly against the issuer as a reason-
able reading will justify.51
This trend towards liberal construction of the liabilities imposed by letters of
credit provided the judicial setting for the consideration of the clean52 letter of
credit in Barclays.
In dealing with the Code, the first step is always to determine whether the
problem comes within its coverage. 53 The court in Barclays had little difficulty
in putting Allied's letter54 within the purview of Article 5, 5r and in finding that
it satisfied the Code's definition of a letter of credit. ° The court then turned to
the central issue---"whether Mercantile can confirm this credit which was issued
by a non-bank, 57 a question which has no explicit answer in the Code.
Under the literal terms of the Code, banks may confirm only letters of credit
issued by other banks.5 8 Mercantile argued, therefore, that it could not be held
50. 425 F.2d at 466.
51. Id. (citing Lamborn v. National Park Bank, 212 App. Div. 25, 203 N.Y.S. 428 (1st
Dep't), aff'd, 240 N.Y. 520, 148 N.E. 664 (1925)).
52. A "dean" letter of credit is one which does not require the presentation of documents
in order to be honored, thereby eliminating any determinations as to conformity of docu-
ments. Several cases illustrate the uses to which clean credits can be puL See Oelbermann v.
National City Bank, 79 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1935), modified, 298 U.S. 638 (1936) (per curiam);
Grouf v. State Nat'1 Bank, 40 F.2d 2 (8th Cir. 1930); Gelpcke v. Quentell, 74 N.Y. 599
(1878).
53. In an attempt to bring uniformity to the use of letters of credit prior to the formula-
tion of the Code, the International Chamber of Commerce began to issue regulations for
banks and other financial institutions, periodically revising them. The full title of the latest
revision, embodied in Brochure No. 222, is Uniform Customs and Practice for Commercial
Documentary Credits, fixed by the Thirteenth Congress of the International Chamber of
Commerce (1962). For a discussion of its effect, and a general comparison of it to Article
5 of the Code, see Expanded Use, supra note 3, at 154-65.
54. For the text of Allied's letter of credit, see 481 F.2d at 1228 n.s.
55. Id. at 1228-29. UCC § 5-102, the scope section of Article 5, provides:
"(1) [Tlhis Article applies
(c) to a credit issued by a bank or other person if the credit is not within subparagraphs
(a) or (b) but conspicuously states that it is a letter of credit or is conspicuously so
entitled."
56. 481 F.2d at 1229. The Code definition of a letter of credit appears in the text accom-
panying note 10 supra.
57. 481 F.2d at 1229.
58. The Code's definition of a confirming bank appears at note 6 supra. Letters of credit
may be issued or confirmed by non-banks. See N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Study of Uniform
Commercial Code, supra note 3, at 1583-84.
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liable under the Code since the issuer was not a bank.59 The court dismissed this
"cogent" argument,60 finding that application of such a rule would not "ad-
vance the policy which gave birth to the rule in the first instance."0 1 Thus, the
court concluded that no policy justification existed for holding that a bank can-
not confirm the credit of a non-bank issuer.0 2
The court next sought to ascertain whether the underlying purposes and poli-
cies of the Code would be furthered by permitting the bank confirmation of a
non-bank credit. One of the explicit purposes and policies of the Code is "to
permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage
and agreement of the parties." 63 Mercantile argued that it was not customary
for a bank to confirm a non-bank credit. In once again rejecting Mercantile's
argument, the court assumed that the transaction was an expansion of commer-
cial practices.64 Thus, the court concluded that "if the parties have molded their
activities so as to come within the scope of the Code," the Code will "accom-
modate this expansion."0 r5 Noting further that there was no indication that the
parties sought to act outside the framework of the Code, the court determined
that the parties intended to come within its coverage.00 Thus, the court con-
cluded that the broad purposes of the Code would be furthered by applying
its rules to the entire transaction. 7 Although this conclusion is apparently cor-
rect, such legal gymnastics were not required to reach the result. Where there is
no intent to act without the Code, and the letter of credit in question not only
satisfies the Code's definition 8 but also comes within the scope of Article 5,00
it is apparent that the transaction is within the purview of the Code. In this re-
spect, the Barclays court was accurate. However, in formulating its argument,
the court actually assumes that which it seeks to conclude-that the transaction
was an expansion of commercial practices. It would seem that an advantageous
adaptation and utilization of the letter of credit in circumstances unforeseen by
the framers of the Code would be sufficient to constitute an expansion of the
Code's coverage of commercial practices. After clearing away the confusing
language, 70 one realizes that this is what the court is attempting to express.
The court next considered whether the policies underlying Article 5 would
be furthered by permitting the confirmation of the credit of a non-bank issuer,
59. 481 F.2d at 1229-30.
60. Id. at 1230.
61. Id. See text accompanying note 63 infra for the policy.
62. 481 F.2d at 1230.
63. UCC § 1-102(2)(b).
64. 481 F.2d at 1230.
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 1231. For example, the parties could have agreed that the obligations stemming
from the transaction were not to be defined by the Code, but by some other source. See
UCC § 1-102(3).
67. 481 F.2d at 1231.
68. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
69. See note 55 supra.
70. See 481 F.2d at 1230-31; text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
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a rule which is not explicit but rather an analogue to specifically codified rules.
It is clear that neither previous case law7 ' nor the Code72 purports to be defini-
tive on the question of letters of credit. The purpose of Article 5 was to reiterate
a few fundamental principles relating to the law of letters of credit and to
present a basis and framework for future development,73 so that the instruments
"by no means become so formalized or stereotyped as to preclude [their] adapt-
ability to new and different commercial situations' 7 4 The court seized upon this
liberal characteristic of Article 5 in holding that a bank may confirm a credit
issued by a non-bank:
The rules codified in Article 5 are only the foundation from which courts must develop,
by analogy, new concepts to meet novel and diverse uses of the letter of credit.7
Thus, Mercantile's letter, according to Liberty and similar cases,7" resulted in
its acceptance of a definite obligation to honor.
While the result in Barclays seems correct, the need for the court's tenuous
reasoning by assumption 77 is far from obvious. The court's use of analogy in
construing the transaction is welcomed, 78 especially when one realizes that the
Code represents a model source of analogy because of the liberality and gener-
ality of its rules and policies. However, several related and helpful theories could
have been pursued. First, it would seem that the intention of the parties should
have been more determinative. 79 Second, Venizelos' requirement that letter of
71. See Harfield, Statutory Rules for Letters of Credit, 1 Bus. L. Rev. 313, 314 (1954).
72. UCC § 5-102(3) provides:
"This Article deals with some but not all of the rules and concepts of letters of credit as
such rules or concepts have developed prior to this act or may hereafter develop. The fact
that this Article states a rule does not by itself require, imply or negate application of the
same or a converse rule to a situation not provided for or to a person not specified by this
Article."
73. See UCC § 5-102, Comment 2. One commentator elaborates: "The draftsmen of
Article 5 set out to codify the legal framework of letters of credit without attempting so
comprehensive a treatment as to hinder the development of new practices and uses or to
impede the flexibility of the letter of credit .... The draftsmen apparently felt, and rightly so,
that to attempt to include detailed treatment of such practices would stymie the development
of new practices and the further streamlining of letter-of-credit transactions. The result,
produced through many cycles of drafting, criticism, and redrafting, is a relatively clear,
general statutory statement of the nature of letters of credit and of the rights and obligations
of the parties. Article 5 makes no attempt to restrict, redirect, or revolutionize letter of credit
law and practice; rather, the Article organizes and sets out existing law in a clear and concise
manner." Expanded Use, supra note 3, at 161 (footnotes omitted). See also Code Treatment,
supra note 3, at 95-97.
74. Expanded Use 151.
75. 481 F.2d at 1231-32.
76. See notes 23, 26 supra.
77. See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
78. See Note, The Uniform Commercial Code as a Premise for Judicial Reasoning, 6S
Colum. L. Rev. 880 (1965).
79. The intention of the parties has been mentioned as a factor that might be considered
by the court. In Powerine Co. v. Russell's, Inc., 103 Utah 441, 451, 135 P.2d 906, 911 (1943),
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credit transactions be construed strongly against the issuer or confirmers ° was
not mentioned even in passing. Finally, the court failed to consider the conse-
quences of an opposite holding. Obviously, such a narrow ruling would not only
have been contrary to the Code's liberal policies, but also would have restricted
commerce in an area in need of flexibility. Breadth and flexibility were necessary
to avoid any undue interference with banking practices8' when the Code was
being drafted, and it is mandatory that courts permit this continuing expansion
in the manner of use of letters of credit. In this respect, Barclays truly fits into
the modern trend.
Michael V. Mitrione
Uniform Commercial Code-Priority of Liens in Secured Transactions-
Packers & Stockyards Act Alters UCC.-A meatpacker, Samuels & Co., Inc.,
purchased cattle from various livestock producers ("sellers"). In accordance
with the normal practice of the industry, Samuels & Co. slaughtered, cooled,
weighed, and sold the cattle, transforming them into fungible goods. To comply
with regulations' implementing the Packers and Stockyards Act,2 the packer
issued checks to the sellers. However, C.I.T. Corp., Samuels & Co.'s source of
finance, had learned of the imminent bankruptcy of the packer and, therefore,
refused to advance the funds necessary to cover the checks issued by the packer,
causing their dishonor. Following an adjudication of the packer's bankruptcy,
the sellers, as a class, filed claims for the amount of the purchase price of the
cattle with the bankruptcy court. C.I.T. opposed this claim on the grounds that
the sellers' interest in the cattle amounted to no more than an unperfected pur-
chase money security interest, subordinate to C.I.T.'s floating lien, which had
been perfected in accordance with the filing provisions of the Texas Uniform
Commercial Code.3 Strictly applying the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),
the District Court for the Northern District of Texas held that the perfected
security interest of C.I.T. was superior to the sellers' unperfected lien.4 The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding, in effect, that the Pack-
it was pointed out that: "(lit is also proper to take into consideration the situation of the
parties, and what can be determined therefrom, as to their probable intent."
80. See text accompanying notes 46-51 supra; Lamborn v. National Park Bank, 212 App.
Div. 25, 33-34, 208 N.Y.S. 428, 436 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 240 N.Y. 520, 148 N.E, 664 (1925).
81. See generally Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 Yale
L.J. 1341 (1948).
1. The practice of prompt payment is regulated by the Secretary of Agriculture. See 9
C.F.R. § 201.43(b) (1973) (purchasers to pay promptly for livestock). See also id. § 201.99
(1973) (rules regulating livestock purchases on a carcass grade, weight, or combination of
grade and weight basis).
2. Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-231 (1970).
3. Tex. Code Bus. & Com. Ann. § 9.301 (1968).
4. In re Samuels & Co., 483 F.2d 557, 562-63 (5th Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 42
U.S.L.W. 3434 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1974) (No. 73-1131).
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ers and Stockyards Act supplanted the Uniform Commercial Code by establish-
ing a controlling course of dealings which imposed a fiduciary obligation on the
packers to pay the sellers. Accordingly, the court held the sellers' interest para-
mount to the perfected security interest of C.I.T. In re Samuels & Co., 483
F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3434 (U.S. Jan.
21, 1974) (No. 73-1131).
Only recently have the courts come to grips with the legal effect of a custom
peculiar to the meat industry-reservation of title by cattle producers in meat
products which terminates only upon payment. This custom was first recognized
judicially in Herington Livestock Auction Co. v. Verschoor.5 There, a sale of
cattle by an auction farm operator to a cattle speculator conditioned the passage
of title upon clearance of the purchaser's check. After the speculator sold the
cattle to a good faith purchaser for value,6 the original seller brought suit claim-
ing that he still retained title to the cattle since he had not been paid by the
speculator. The court held that the agreement expressly reserving title in the
plaintiff did not prevent title from passing to the subsequent good faith pur-
chaser for value,7 since under UCC § 2-401(1) s the plaintiff merely retained a
purchase money security interest in the cattle, which he had not perfected by
filing.9
Factually similar to Samuels is the recent Indiana case of First National Bank
v. Smoker.10 In Smoker plaintiff sold cattle to a packer over the course of a
year. Subsequently, the defendant, a bank, acquired a security interest in the
packer's inventory, which it perfected. In order to meet payments owed to the
bank on this debt, the packer sold the cattle producer's carcasses. Plaintiff as-
serted that, as a result of the intentions of the parties to the original sale,"'
custom and usage of the trade,' 2 and the course of dealing1 3 between the cattle
producer and the packer, he retained title to the cattle, thus negating the bank's
right to proceeds from the sale, and thereby rendering the bank liable for com-
mon law conversion.' 4 In rejecting this argument, the court noted that plaintiff
5. 179 N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1970).
6. Iowa Code § 554.1201(19) (1971) defines good faith as "honesty in fact in the conduct
or transaction concerned?' Purchase "includes taking by sale .... " Id. § 554.1201(32). "(A]
person gives 'value' for rights if he acquires them... (c) by accepting delivery pursuant to
a pre-existing contract for purchase ... ." Id. § 554.1201(44).
7. Id. § 554.2403(1) provides that a person "with voidable title has power to transfer a
good title to a good faith purchaser for value."
8. See text accompanying note 15 infra (Indiana's similar provision).
9. 179 N.W.2d at 496.
10. 286 N.E.2d 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972).
11. See text accompanying note 21 infra.
12. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 19-1-205(2) (1964) defines a usage of trade as "any practice...
having such regularity of observance in a ... trade as to justify an expectation that it will
be observed ... .
13. Id. § 19-1-205(1) defines a course of dealing as a "sequence of previous conduct
between the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing
a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct."
14. 286 N.E.2d at 207.
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failed to take into account Code provisions, such as UCC § 2-401 (1), dealing
with the effect of explicit agreements retaining title in the seller when goods are
in the possession of the buyer. This section provides in pertinent part that:
Any retention or reservation by the seller of the title (property) in goods shipped or
delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest.1
The court concluded by quoting Herington'0 for the proposition that:
[F]or purposes of determination of when an interest becomes a security interest, the
prior metaphysical concept of title has been abandoned and analysis of the steps
taken by the parties is substituted.17
On a petition for rehearing,' 8 the seller contended that the normal effect of
UCC § 2-401 could be altered pursuant to language in the introduction to that
section. This introduction provides in pertinent part:
Each provision of this Article [Chapter] ... applies irrespective of title to the goods
except where the provision refers to such title. Insofar as situations are not covered
by the other provisions of this Article [Chapter] and matters concerning title become
material the following rules apply .... 19
The seller argued on the basis of the second sentence quoted above that course
of dealings and usage of trade constituted situations which are covered by other
provisions (UCC § 1-102 and UCC § 1-205), thus altering the normal effect of
UCC § 2-401. In rejecting this argument, the court read the introduction as an
entirety, concluding that the Code drafters only meant to exclude those situa-
tions governed by provisions referring specifically to title. Thus, since the Code
provisions relied on by the seller did not refer to title, UCC § 2-401 (1) did
apply.20
The seller also argued that UCC § 2-401 may be altered by agreements be-
tween the parties under UCC § 1-102 which states that "[t]he effect of pro-
visions of this Act may be varied by agreement . ... 21 In rejecting plaintiff's
petition, the court pointed out that the seller in Smoker also had failed to read
this section in its entirety, stating:
[S]aid section contains several important qualifications, one of which is that the pro-
visions may be varied only when it is not otherwise expressly provided in the Act. It
15. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 19-2401(1) (1964).
16. 179 N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1970); see text accompanying notes 5-9 supra.
17. 286 N.E.2d at 213 (quoting 179 N.W.2d at 495).
18. 287 N.E.2d 788 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972).
19. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 19-2401 (1964) (emphasis added).
20. 287 N.E.2d at 789-90. Although the court did not raise the point, there is another
ground upon which it could be argued that the Code sections dealing with trade usages and
course of dealings, UCC § 1-102 and UCC § 1-205, were not intended by the drafters to
modify UCC § 2-401. By limiting the exception to situations "not covered by the other
provisions of this Article," only Article 2 sections were contemplated as capable of altering
the transfer of title. For an example of a provision of the Code which can affect title see
UCC § 2-327, which deals with special incidents of sale on approval and sale or return.
21. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 19-1-102(3) (1964).
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is expressly provided in [UCC § 2-401] that any agreement concerning the passage of
title is subject to the provisions of [UCC § 2-401(1)] and the provisions of the Article
[Chapter] on Secured Transactions. Thus any agreement concerning the passage of
title, whether oral or written, is subject to the provision in [UCC § 2-401] ....
As in Smoker, the sellers in Samuels reserved title when they delivered cattle
to the packer 2s C.I.T., Samuels & Co.'s financier, had perfected an after-acquired
security interest on the inventory of the packer,2 4 as had the bank in Smoker.
The District Court in Samuels applied the UCC, thus reaching a conclusion
similar to that reached in Svwker-that the seller's reservation of title consti-
tuted an unperfected purchase money security interest subordinate to the per-
fected security interest that the financier had in the packer's inventory.m
The court of appeals in Samuels, however, reasoned that such an analysis
failed to reckon with the effect of various federal regulations requiring a packer
to make prompt payment to his cattle suppliers, and to keep each supplier's
carcasses separately identifiable until payment was made.20 According to the
court, these regulations were promulgated under the Packers and Stockyards
Act2 7 to deal with the problems created by the fungibility of meat and meat by-
products. Due to this fungible quality, it is nearly impossible for any seller to
locate and identify his livestock. Practically speaking, the cattle are lost to the
seller as soon as the packer issues his check. For this reason, the seller is not
protected against the insolvency of the buyer by the normal UCC remedy of
reclamation. 8
In order to provide such protection to the vulnerable seller, the court read
22. 287 N.E.2d at 789-90 (emphasis added).
23. 483 F.2d at 560.
24. Id. at 559.
25. Samuels quoted the district court as describing the seller's reservation of title as the
"mere reservation of a security interest... ." Id. at 559.
26. Id. at 561-62. 9 C-F.R. § 201.43(b) (1973) provides in pertinent part: 'Purchasers
to pay promptly for livestock. Each packer... shall, before the close of the next business
day following the purchase of livestock and the determination of the amount of the purchase
price, transmit or deliver to the seller or his duly authorized agent the full amount of the
purchase price, unless otherwise expressly agreed between the parties before the purchase of
the livestock. Any such agreement shall be disclosed in the... purchaser's records and on the
accounts or other documents issued by the purchaser relating to the transaction." Id. §
201.99(b) (1973) provides in pertinent part: "Each packer purchasing livestock on a
carcass grade rand/or] weight basis, shall maintain the identity of each seller's livestock ....
27. 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-231 (1970).
28. Tex. Code Bus. & Com. Ann. § 2.702(b) (1968) provides in pertinent part: 'here
the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while insolvent he may
reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days after the receipt .... " The majority
also referred to the "hot check" provision of the UCC, erroneously citing to UCC § 2-403,
the code provision on power to transfer, good faith purchase of goods, and entrusting. 483
F.2d at 563. The correct section is UCC § 2-507, which provides in part: "[w]here payment
is due and demanded on the delivery to the buyer.., his right as against the seller to retain
or dispose of [the goods] is conditional upon his making payment due." The comments to
UCC § 2-507 make it clear that the section is in many ways an extension of UCC § 2-702.
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into the federal Act and its regulations the imposition of a fiduciary obligation
upon the packer to pay the seller:
Not by contract but by statute and regulation a packer lacks full dominion over the
carcasses until the seller has been paid. Where the packer defaults by the issuance of
a bad check (and destroys the identity of the security by processing the carcasses into
fungible meat products), the seller is the beneficiary of a trust imposed by remedial
statute.
29
The Samuels majority also found persuasive the fact that the Act and its ap-
plicable regulations comprise "a course of dealing and usage of trade known to
both the bankrupt packer and C.I.T., which had financed it for an extended
period." 30
This language is unfortunate, because it carries with it the impression that a
course of dealing or a trade usage can itself render UCC § 2-401 ineffective. Just
such a finding was properly rejected in Smoker.3 1 However, since the majority
noted that "more than an unperfected security interest subject to reclamation is
reserved for the cattle seller,"32 it appears that the court meant to bypass the
effect of the UCC altogether, relying on the federal Act to provide protection
to the seller. This reading harmonizes to some extent the analysis employed in
Samuels with that of Smoker.
The Samuels majority is not alone in concluding that the Packers and Stock-
yards Act can affect state commercial law. This view has been expressed by a
small minority of courts which have found that the Act protected innocent
market agencies from liability for conversion.38 Some commentators have ap-
proved of this view.34 Furthermore, the court in Samuels noted that this view
was supported by dicta in recent cases that inclined towards a broad interpreta-
tion of the regulatory provisions of the Act.3 5
However, in a strong dissenting opinion, Judge Godbold criticized the Samuels
majority for doing violence to the commercial law of Texas. 6 Judge Godbold
noted that in various commercial situations involving dishonored commercial
paper and perfected security interests, a majority of courts have held that the
29. 483 F.2d at 563.
30. Id.
31. See notes 10-22 supra and accompanying text.
32. 483 F.2d at 563.
33. Sullivan Co. v. Wells, 89 F. Supp. 317 (D. Neb. 1950); Blackwell v. Laird, 236 Mo.
App. 1217, 163 S.W.2d 91 (1942), overruled by Farmers State Bank v. Stewart, 454 S.W.2d
908, 917 (Mo. 1970); Montana Meat Co. v. Missoula Livestock Auction Co., 125 Mont. 66,
230 P.2d 955 (1951) ; Kent v. Wright, 198 Okla. 703, 175 P.2d 802 (1946).
34. See 47 Colum. L. Rev. 861, 863 (1947); 31 Marq. L. Rev. 103, 104 (1947). But see
14 U. Chi. L. Rev. 713, 718 (1947).
35. Glover Livestock Commn Co. v. Hardin, 454 F.2d 109, 111 (8th Cir. 1972), rev'd,
411 U.S. 182 (1973) ; Bruhns Freezer Meats, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Agrc., 438 F.2d
1332, 1336 (8th Cir. 1971) ; Swift & Co. v. United States, 393 F.2d 247, 253 (7th Cir. 1968);
Bowman v. United States Dep't of Agric., 363 F.2d 81, 85 (5th Cir. 1966).
36. 483 F.2d at 564.
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Act neither expressly nor impliedly supplanted local commercial law.3 7 Relying
on this view, Judge Godbold further argued that neither the regulatory sweep
of the Act nor any implication drawn from legislative history38 justified the con-
clusion that the Act could bypass the commercial law of the states.
The judge also observed that the case cited by the majority in support of the
proposition that packers are made fiduciaries under the Act involved not a packer
but a market agency. 39 Moreover, market agencies are expressly made fiduciaries
by the regulations;40 in contrast, packers must comply with different regulations,
which do not impose such a fiduciary obligation.41 The dissent reasoned:
Market agencies and dealers must register . . . and must be bonded to secure their
financial obligations.... As early as 1923 the Secretary promulgated a regulation which
prohibited market agencies from using funds of owners or consignors of livestock or
mingling such funds with its own .... The present regulations continue the fiduciary
relationship . . . [requiring] maintenance of a separate ... bank account .... The
financial practices of packers are not regulated in the same manner ....
Thus, the Act distinguishes the role of a packer in the meat industry from that
of a market agency or a dealer.
A recent decision bolstering the dissent's argument that the Act is incapable
of supplanting state commercial law is Farmers State Bank v. Stewart.4 3 There,
a bank, whose mortgage was violated by the sale of livestock to a market agency,
sued the market agency for conversion. In overruling Blackweli v. Laird44-an
early case often cited by courts holding that the Act could supplant the com-
mercial law of the states4 -- the court observed:
37. See Adams v. Greeson, 300 F.2d 555, 557-58 (10th Cir. 1962); United States v.
Union Livestock Sales Co., 298 F.2d 755, 757-58 (4th Cir. 1962); John Clay & Co. Livestock
Comm'n v. Clements, 214 F.2d 803, 806-07 (5th Cir. 1954) ; Sig Ellingson & Co. v. De Vries,
199 F.2d 677, 678-79 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 934 (1953) ; Birmingham v. Rice
Bros., 238 Iowa 410, 26 N.W.2d 39, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 768 (1947); Citizens State Bank v.
Farmers Union Livestock Coop. Co., 165 Kan. 96, 193 P.2d 636 (1948); Mason City Prod.
Credit Ass'n v. Sig Eliingson & Co., 205 Minn. 537, 286 N.W. 713, cert. denied, 303 US. 599
(1939); Walker v. Caviness, 256 S.W.2d 880, 882-83 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
38. The monopolistic and price fixing tendencies of the packing industry were the cause
of much concern at the time the Act was passed and comprised the motivation expressed by
members of the Congress in passing the Act. See 61 Cong. Rec. 1808 (1921) (remarks of
Rep. Tincher). See also id. at 1799-1800 (remarks of Rep. Haugen).
39. In Bowman v. United States Dep't of Agric., 363 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1966), the court
held that the market agencies were fiduciaries and that they violated their fiduciary obliga-
tions by failing to maintain separate custodial accounts. Id. at 85-86. See also United States
v. Donahue Bros., 59 F.2d 1019, 1022-23 (8th Cir. 1932) (market agency held to have
violated its fiduciary obligations by commingling funds).
40. 9 C.F.R. § 201.42(a) (1973) provides in pertinent part that "[elach payment made
by a livestock.., buyer to a market agency ... is a trust fund...."
41. See notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text.
42. 483 F.2d at 567-68 (citations omitted).
43. 454 S.W.2d 908 (Mo. 1970).
44. 236 Mo. App. 1217, 163 S.W.2d 91 (1942).
45. In Blackwell v. Laird, 236 Mo. App. 1217, 1222-23, 163 S.W.2d 91, 94 (1942), the
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"There is nothing in the Act to indicate that Congress intended to protect market agen-
cies or purchasers at the stockyards from liability on account of fraudulent sales of
livestock either not owned by the consignors at all or covered by chattel mortgages."0 4
It is submitted that the Stewart court's finding that market agencies are not
afforded protection under the Act is correct. Furthermore, the legislative history
of the Act indicates that the Congress was not attempting to protect any com-
ponent of the meat industry from the effects of state law.47 It follows that cattle
sellers, like market agencies, should be left to their remedies at state law. The
Samuels majority ignored this argument. For this reason alone, it can be
criticized.
Samuels can be criticized on still another ground. The decision renders un-
predictable the validity of security agreements between parties conducting busi-
ness under the Packers and Stockyards Act. The Samuels court described the
purpose of the Act as the "protection of the producer's and consumer's purse. '48
However, neither the producer nor the consumer will be served if financiers are
hesitant to provide capital necessary to the meat industry because the protec-
tion normally afforded them under the UCC by a perfected security interest is
thwarted by a questionable construction of a federal regulation.
James J. Mahon, Jr.
court, in finding market agencies immune from liability for conversion, stated, "a public
utility which is required by law to render specific services... without discrimination, should
not be considered in the same category with those who may or may not transport, store, or
sell property at the request of one in possession thereof."
46. 454 S.W.2d at 913, quoting Allen C. Driver, Inc. v. Mills, 199 Md. 420, 86 A.2d 724
(1952).
47. See, e.g., note 38 supra and accompanying text.
48. 483 F.2d at 563.
